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Ift.RODUCTION
The purpose ot this thesis is, as indicated by the title,
to investigate the system ot philosophy and morality delineated
by Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Younger.

The volumes ot Senecan

composition are numerous and varied in theme, but throughout
there pervades a philosophical influence entirely new to Rome.
Other teachers adhering to their particular schools ot thought,
had brought torth many ot the tenets held by Seneca.

It is here

that the individuality ot the man exhibits itself in that his
was a system composed ot the elements ot many schools.

This

investigation purposes to analyze Senecan teaching both in its
origin and in its content, in its theory and in practice.
Truth, objective truth, is the same for the pagan as it is
tor the Christian.

Blinded though he might have been by the

grossness of error, let us give the pagan credit tor his efforts
to arrive at the eternal verities.

We who possess the inestima-

ble light ot grace, the heritage of well defined and accurately
stated philosophical teaching, the books ot Divine Revelation
and the supernatural guidance of an infallible authority, too
often take· it for gran-ted that the same position obtained for
pagan thinkers of the past.

The actual case is far otherwise.

"Flying blind,u to use a current aeronautical term, they had no
guide other than the light ot reason, often grossly perverted
either by personal misconduct on the one hand or on the other by
the materialistic environment in which they lived.

But they too,

2

many of them, aspired to a more rational existence, and in saner
moments sought to discover and formulate standards of life which
would ultimately lead to a reasonable goal.

Seneca may be cred-

ited with such aspirations, laboring the while in the darkness
of paganism.
In the endeavor to formulate from his writings a set group
of principles which may be styled the "Senecan System of Morality," we must define his position on the existence and nature ot
God, the human soul, the purpose ot life, man's attitude towards
death, life hereafter and immortality.
mass of Senecan philosophy.
indicated.

These topics contain the

They will be studied in the order

A code of morality summarized from the multifarious

works of a man whose very ideas were themselves a compilation of
the thoughts of other masters, will of its very nature admit of
many discrepancies.

Thus, from the tangled mass of inconsisten-

cies, not to say pure guess-work and actual contradictions
appearing in the various works of Seneca, it will be our endeavor
to evolve some tangible system of thought which might be said to
be Senecan Morality, Senecan Philosophy.
Statements of Seneca to which reference is made will be
taken from the Dialogi, the Epistulae ~ Lucilium and the
Naturales Quaestiones.1
Only brief mention will be made of the

1. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Opera Omnia, (Teubner Edition,
1898).

Tragoediae, and this tor several reasons.
cient to mention the most important.

or

these it is suffi-

While the plays abound in

moral and philosophical observations, these latter are based on
mythological references, and in the words ot Seneca himself 2
they should bear no weight in so important a discussion.

2.

~·

xxiv, 18.

Jte.. lxxxii, 16.
Ad Marciam

~

Consolatione, xix, 4.

4
CHAPI.'ER I
SENECA: EDUCATION AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born in Corduba (the present
cordova), Spain about the year 4 B.C., but was brought to Rome
in early life.

His first teachers of note were Sotion, the

Pythagorean of Alexandria, and Fabianus Papirius.
he wrote in later life, "Fabianus,

~!!his

philosophis, sed ~ veris et antiquis" ,3
ence for this master.

Of the latter

cathedrariis

indicating his rever-

By the time he was twenty-five, Seneca

was a thorough-going follower of Pythagoras.

For it was in

19 A.D. that his father made the lad give up his newly acquired
habit of abstinence from flesh meat.4
tice advocated by the Pythagoreans.

This latter was a pracAs

thought nobly of this school for a time.

he himself says, Seneca
He writes, ".!!2.!! pudebit

fateri quem mihi amorem Pythagoras inieceritff.5
From the Pythagoreans, Sotion and Fabianus Papirius, the
young student passed to the lecture room of Attalus the Stoic,
which latter teacher had a more decided influence on his char-

J.

~

4.

~·

Brevitate Vitae, x, 1.
cviii, 22.
Ibid., cviii, 17.
~· lxiii, 15.
Quaestiones Naturales, viii, 32, 2.
5. ~· cviii, 17.

5

acter.6
~ost

The elder Seneca described this new pedagogue as the

eloquent and by tar the most acute philosopher of his time,

nmagnae vir eloquentiae !! philosophis, quos nostra aetas vidit,
1onge et subtilissimus

..!! faoundissimus" .7

Long years later as

an old man, Seneca spoke with reverence and affection of his
master in the school of Stoicism.s
Quintilian tells us that the Roman character was tor taking up the thoughts developed by the Greeks, and putting them
into practice.
~more

And, as a true Roman, he adds that this is the

important phase of living, "Quantum enim Graeci praeceptis

~alent, tantum Romani (quod·!!! maius) exemplis".9

Seneca,

earnest in his quest tor the "summum bonum", practiced literally
the dicta of his new-found school.

He undertook such gross

imprudences as cold baths in winter, and by reason of his already
weakened condition contracted tuberculosis.

The thought of his

pld father was the only restraining force which deterred him from
suicide.
Thoroughly versed in the systems of Pythagoras and the

6. Francis Holland, Seneca, (London: Longmans, Green
and Company, 1920). p. 15.

7. Suasoriae, ii.

!2·

lxvii, 15.
h• ix, 7.
!lt• lxiii, 5.
~. lxxxi, 22.
~· cviii, 13.
!P.· ex, 14.
9. Institutiones Oratoriae, rli, 2.

8.

6
stoics, Seneca also read widely of the works of Epicurus.
Though he never adopted the practices taught by the Cynics,
he often speaks favorably ot the arch-cynic Diogenes,10 and
again and again refers to the Cynic Demetrius as a man worthy ot
the highest esteem.ll
The lite of Seneca was one of singularly dramatic contrasts
and vicissitudes.12
He began his public lite in the year 32
A.D. under Claudius.

Banished in 41 A.D. to the island ot Cor-

sica, Seneca used his time of exile writing his philosophical
treatises.

He was restored to favor ten years later, and was

appointed tutor for the young Nero, a task he fulfilled until
the year 62 A.D.

This latter date marked the beginning ot

Seneca's retirement.

For three years he enjoyed the privacy ot

home lite, during which time he wrote many ot his beautiful moral
epistles to his friend Lucilius.

In the year 65 A.D., it was

recommended to him by Nero that he liquidate himselt.l3

In

brief this is the general summary ot Seneca's lite.
As

a young lawyer at the court ot Caligula, as a senator

during the reign ot Claudius, and virtually as administrator tor

10.

xxix, 1.
xlvii, 12.
EP· xc, 14.
11 • • • xx, 9 •
• lxJ.i, 3.
~· lxvii, 14.
~. xci, 19.
12. ~. Mackail, Latin Liter~~f' (Chicago, Ill., :
Charles Scribner's Sons,~ • p. 172.
13. Tacitus, Annales, xv.
Suetonius, Vitae.
~.

~.

7

Nero, Seneca passed the greater part of his life under the mad
despotism of the Roman court.

Lucas describes the situation:

In a perfectly desperate position, with
only one path before him, he could tread it finely; but it was a desperate position indeed, when
that agile brain could not flnd a way round and
justify itself to the same.
His good sense and judgment, together with an even tempered disposition enabled Seneca to last at the court longer,
perhaps, than others of the imperial advisors.

He knew his Rome

much better than many native-born Romans knew her.l5

During

his tenure of office he was able to amass a fortune which in our
coin would exceed fifteen million dollars, and held estates in
various parts of the empire~6
Such was the background in which Seneca tried to pursue the
higher things of the mind.

All his writings and philosophical

teachings must be viewed in the light of the splendor--and constant peril of the court.

The morality he would set forth was to

be no abstract set of formulae intended tor drawing-room perusal,
or even as applicable to life in a normal situation.

It was

written by a man or action for men
••• living under a reign of terror, whose lives were

14. F.L. Lucas, seneca and the Elizabethan·Tra~edf,
(Cambridge, Mass.: The University Press, 1 22 . p. 45.
15. R.M. Gummere, Seneca the Philosopher and His Modern
Message, (Boston: Marshall Jones Company,~22). p. 50.
16. H.N. Fowler, A History of Roman Literature, (New York:
D. Appleton and Company:-1932). P• 178

8

in daily peril; and its object was to tree them from
anxiety and brace their minds to meet their fate
with indifference and dignity~?

17. Holland, op. cit.,

p. 186.

9

CHA.PrER II

THE SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY AT ROME
Seneca's thoughts on the subject or lite, death and the
hereafter can be studied only after a thorough understanding or
his entire philosophy or life, against the background or the
divers schools of thought of his day. Terming philosophy the
"vitae lex" ,18 he qualifies himself to formulate his own canons
or belief in as much as the light or philosophy shines tor all,
"philosophia ••• omnibus lucet"~9

Beginning his study, Seneca

makes bold to say that he will cover the entire field of moral
philosophy and solve all the problems arising therefrom, ffscis
enim

~

moralem philosophiam valle conplecti

pertinentia quaestiones explicareu.20

~

omnes

~

!!!

And as an end to be

attained, we are warned that "auditionem ••• philosophorum ••• ~
propositum beatae vitae trahendam".21
In the ages before the ideals of Christianity became the
well nigh universal guide of men's lives, there arose periodically a creed especially adapted to the men or a given age.22
In the first century A.D., it called itself Stoicism.

Undoubt-

18. ~· xciv, 39.
19. !I?.· xliv, 3.
20. !£• cvi, 2.
21. ~· cviii, 35.
22. F.L. Lucas, Seneca and the Elizabethian Tragedy,
Cambridge: The University Press, 1922). p. 47.

10
edlY the noblest and purest ot the ancient sects, 23

Stoicism

passed beyond the limit ot the schools and became at once a religious creed and a code ot morals tor every-day use in the lite

ot Rome.24

The ancient school ot Stoicism had been founded by
the Greek, Zeno,25 and received its name from the tact that Zeno
had lectured on the Painted Porch or Stoa Poikile ot Athens.
The Stoic doctrines lay tallow on Latin soil during several
centuries before Christ.26
It had a good deal ot potential
energy, but as such remained purely potential, until the birth ot
Quintus Sextius Niger about 70 B.C.
sotion and Papirius Fabianus.

Two ot his scholars were

As has been noted,27

these latter

were followers ot Pythagoras but aided greatly the efforts ot
~iger

in formulating what they liked to consider a definitely

Roman school.

They were to inculcate their doctrines in the mind

ot the young Seneca. Niger seems to have combined his stoic
tendencies,28 with a number ot Pythagorean elements, and into it
all "infused a fresh vigor ot moral zealn.29

23. F.W. Ferrar, Seekers after God, (London:---, 1874).
intro., p. 5.
--Ibid., P• 33.

24. J.W. Mackail, Latin Literature, (Chicago, Ill.:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923). p. 171.
25. Ad Helviam de Consolatione, xii, 4.
~. lxxxiii-;-9.
26. Holland, op. cit., p. 170.
27. cr. ante, p. 4.
28. !;e_. lxiv.
29. J.E. Sandys, A Companion to Latin Studies, (Cambridge:
The University Press, 192IT. p. 710.
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The Romans wanted a system of rules which would govern conduct, the "quod ~ maius" of Q.uintilian..3°

They were often

kept back in the theological development of their ideas by a
pragmatism that throttled the desire for knowledge, that subordinated the search for the unknown to respect for what exists.31
Whereas science concerns itself with the quest after truth regardless of the consequences of its being brought to light, the
Roman feared such consequences.

And in conditions such as those

in which Seneca lived, well he might fear them.

In subsequent

pages of this discussion it will be noted what effect such
materialistic influences had on the thinking process of Seneca.32
He could go just so far in formulating his independent system of
morals, then when confronted by the impregnable barrier of the
very practical consideration of life or death, he altered his
plan of action to suit the circumstances.
The Stoic school would have it that the soul is corporeal
and that it grows to perfection of reason with the growth of the
body.

And since it is corporeal with the body, the soul ceases

to exist at death.33

With this as a starting point, all good

30. Institutiones Oratoriae, xii, 2.
31. A. Grenier, The Roman Spirit, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf. 1926);--p. 397.
32. Cf. post p. 71.
33. C.T. Cruttwell, A History of Roman Literature,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886).
p. J88.

~

----------------------------------------------------------------,
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stoics taught the end of life, the flsummum bonum" of Seneca, was
the agreement of man in thought and action with "natura:"

-

"In-

terim, quod inter omnia Stoicos convenit rerum naturae adsentior
••• sapientia ~.u34

This latter term was variously defined as

the "nature of man", the nature of things in general", and the
nnature of the universe".
(virtus),

This harmony with nature is virtue

or wisdom (sapientia).

Similarly, all things foolish

(stulte) were vice, or a lack of harmony with nature.

Things in

between or events in general, as well as "fortuna", were classed
as the "indifferentia".35

This school demanded not a mere curb-

ing of the passions in man, but their entire suppression and
eradication.
Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an
nullos, saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetic! temperant. Ego non video, quomodo
salubrig esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas
morbi.J
The Stoic had a God reduced to unity from the many deities
of early paganism.

He was hardly a personality; in any case he

had little relation with the universe.
sidered as "inditterentia",37

ot the wise man.

Lite and death were con-

and were submitted to the choice

If it is appropriate tor him to remain in lite,

Vita Beata, iii, 3.
~·
lxxxii, 10, 14.
Cf. Cicero, ~ Finibus, iii, 50 tf.
36. ~· cxvi, 1.
37. ~· lxxxii, 10.
34.
35.

~

13
he does so; it the balance inclines to the other side as a

con~

venient way ot obviating difficulties, the door is open. Nothing
compels him to stay.3 8
This principle sanctions the Cato eulogized so often by Seneca;39

it is likewise applicable to Seneca

himself and a host of Stoics who during the reign ot Nero followed his example.

The continuous harping on this idea on the

one hand, and on the other constant dread, made suicide extraordinarily prevalent--suicide out ot pure ennui, discontent, or
tear of the consequences of living.4°
Viciously good and morbidly healthy,41

the Stoic sage put

himself in the light ot a rigid corpse floating on the tide ot
events.· He trained his will to will nothing.4 2 He thus lived
in a sort ot subnormal or subconscious ease by reason ot his
complete indifference to the tears--likewise the pleasures--sur- .
rounding him.

Stoicism, followed to its logical conclusions,

may in many ot its tenets be termed a philosophy ot cowardice.
Rather than tight the passions, the Stoics would be rid of them.
Either as the savage they teared death with an intensity of terror; or glutted with the crimes or sorrows of lite, they found

38. Sandys, op. cit., p. 709.
39. ~· civ, 29.
lxxii, 12.
!E.. lxxxii' 13.
De Traniuillitate Animi, xvi, 1.
De Pro~ dentia, 1, 11, 11-12.
40. Ferrar, op. cit., p. 49.
41. R! Constantia Sapientis, i, 1, 1.
42. Lucas, op. cit., p. 47.

JP•

~

-~------------------------------------------------------------~
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living insupportable and slunk to death as a refuge with a cowardice which vaunted itself as courage.43

In so much as it

advocated the elimination of inordinate passions, it shone
brightly amid the profligacy of ancient Rome.
In its practical aspects, Stoicism may be said to stand
midway between the extremes of Epicureanism and Cynicism.
latter cult had but few adherents,

ow reason

The

ot its extreme pes-

simism.

It may be termed the superlative--the reductio ad absurdum--or the Stoics. 44
The Cynics derived their name from the
Greek word meaning "dog", from what appeared to some of the ancients to be the doglike brutality of their customs.

Juvenal

ironically remarks that the Stoics were the same as the Cynics,
differing only "by a tunic" which the latter had discarded.45
Referring to the concrete aspect of any Roman system of thought
the Cynic principles are mentioned in Seneca only in extreme
measures, when the milder torm of Stoic passivism would not stand
up under the force ot circumstances.46
Among Roman moralists the sect of Epicurus attracted few
disciples.

With its highest good the satisfaction ot man's sen-

sual or physical appetites the teachings ot the Epicureans did

43. Ferrar, op. cit., p. 51.
44. •seneca••, in Warner's Library of the World's Best
Literature, p. 13132.
-45. Juvenal, ~· xiii, 122.
46. !!!.• lxii, 3.
~ Providentia, v, 7.

~------------------------------------------~
r-
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not appeal to those whose efforts were bent either on correcting
living, or on making life livable under prevailing conditions.
The Stoics seeing their efforts thwarted, if not in fact, at
least in the theory underlying the Epicurean system, carried the
contest beyond the mere difference-of-opinion stage, as is
clearly indicated in several passages in Seneca.
scribes the Epicureans:

He thus de-

Epicureum, laudantem statum quietae civitatis et inter convivia cantusque vitam exigentis.ff 47
"~

-Along with their- moral differences the Stoics took issue with

the Epicureans, as they did in turn with the other schools tor
their opinions on the hereafter, on the nature of God, the human
soul and other tenets of their sect.
The school of Epicurus held that the soul was as much corporeal as was the body of an animal, that it was composed of
very fine particles united in one mass.48
While the soul is
said to be distributed over all the body, its chief seat is in
the breast.

Virtue is pursued because it is the means of being

tranquil, of getting more rest, "corpus sine dolore ••• animus
~ perturbatione."49 Since life was believed to terminate
with death, the soul being mortal, the summum bonum

47.

!:e.· lxxxviii, 5.

Warner's Library, etc. op. cit., p. 13132.
Sandys, op. cit., p. 707.
48. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, III.
49. ~· lxvi, 45.

of this

~--------------------~
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school was complete physical well-being.

There was a multi-

plicity of gods living in the inter.mundia or space between the
world of matter and world of nothingness, but they had absolutelY no control or any relation whatsoever with the affairs of men.
TheY endeavored to prove this latter point by noting the inequal
ity in the apportionment of the goods and evils of life.5°
It often happened that the doctrines of Epicurus were held
to the charge of corrupting morals, and leading men into lives
of degeneration.5 1
So claimed, for the most part, the whole
sect of the Stoics. 52
But as Seneca well notes·in several
places, "many have recourse to him through a bad motive thinking
that they will have in him a screen for their own vices.• 5 3
Atter the time of Cicero and more especially in the reign
of Augustus, the teachings of Pythagoras were revived, and blended all the prevalent systems of Plato, Zeno and Epicurus with a
sort of mystic tinge.

Pythagoras is said to have coined the

word "philosophy" when replying to a question as to what he considered himself in the domain of rationality.

He answered "a

philosopher" (a seeker after wisdom), for he considered it the

50. Sandys, op. cit., p. 698.
51. !E_. xxxiii, 2.
52. De Vita Beata, xiii, 2.
53. !E.· xxi, 10.
De Vita Beata, xiii, 2.
Ibid., xii, 4.

~---------------------------------.
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height of arrogance for one to think himself a sage, that is, one
who has acquired knowledge. 54
Adherents of Pythagoreanism believed in the soul, a spiritual substance in man.

All actions of

this life should be performed in view of an infinite future.
More definitely than did the other schools, Pythagoreanism propagated the belief in a future life, and went even to the extent .of
giving a form to this belief.

Once the soul leaves the body it

goes to Hades, an underground stopping place, where it is purified, awaiting reincarnation.

It returns to earth again for new

trials, and will inhabit animate, vegetable, animal or human
life, higher or lower forms of existence, depending on how well
it has merited.

"Nulla anima interit,

~

cessat quidem nisi

tempore exiguo, dum in aliud corpus transfunditur."55

In his

De Beneficiis, Seneca tells us an interesting and rather amusing
story of an exact Pythagorean who would pay back the debt he owed
to a friend now dead.

At first the philosopher planned to keep

the money owed his friend, the latter having died.

The neigh-

bors, however, reminded him of his own preaching that we continue
to exist after death and that in view of this fact he still owed
the debt.

Suddenly aware of his inconsistency, or perhaps of

this practical application of his creed, the philosopher went to

54. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. viii, cap. ii.
55. ~· cviii, 19.

~--------------------------------~
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the shop of his deceased friend, flung the money through the open
door, and chided himself for having had a temptation to infidelity.56

The doctrine, therefore, abounds in ascetic precepts
tending to insure purity of sou1. 57
Sotion, the Pythagorean,
forbade Seneca to eat flesh meat, lest he commit parricide by
injuring the soul of an ancestor with either teeth or fork.5S

They practiced frugality, temperance and vegetarianism, and had
many followers in Rome.59
As did the Stoics, these men believed
in the utter destruction ot the passions.

fl8olebat dicere Fabianus (Pythagorianus) ••• contundi debere, ~ vellicari.fl 60

56. De Beneticiis, vii, 21.
57. Grenier, op. cit., p. 372.
58. ~· cviii, 19.
59. Ibid., 17.
60. ~ Brevitate Vitae, x, 1.

~------~----------------------------.
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CHAPI'ER III
SOURCES OF SENECAN PHILOSOPHY
such were the systems

o~

thought to which Seneca was ex-

posed, from which he could and did draw

~reely

in evolving a new

and, if not a more practical, at least a more pleasant standard
of action and living.
rtmus,"61

While he cautions us

"~

veritatem quae-

it is doubtful if Seneca had any objective ideal

truth in mind.

o~

His many inconsistencies and contradictions il-

lustrate his attitude of making his principles subject to the
exigencies

o~

the time.

The result of his entire investigations

leaves the riddle of life still unsolved for Seneca, ffquod est
!pessimum numguam sciens cuius esses status.ff 62
Senecan teaching
~as

a sort of amalgamation of the moral principles

curus and Pythagoras, "Nostram accipe.

!!2!! alligo !!!! ad
censendi ius." 63

~

aliquem

~

o~

Nostram autem

Stoicis proceribus;

Zeno, Epi~

dico,

lli et mihi

In this respect Seneca was like many of the
Roman Stoics, eclectic or encyclopaedic in his views. 64
Though
these various teachers differed in so much as the first mentioned

61. De Otio, iii, 1.
62. Ad Mareiam de Consolatione, xvii, 1.
63. De Vita Beata, iii, 2.
Alb~Grenierl The Roman Spirit, (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf. 1926}.--p. 397.
F.J. Miller, Seneca's Tragedies, (New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1917). intro. p. 8.
J.E. Sandys, A Companion to Latin Studies, (Cambridge:
The University Press, 192IT. p. 710.

~----------------~
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proceeded from idealism, the second from materialism, and the
third from a sort of spiritualism, it mattered little since their
precepts came to the same thing. 65
Seneca showed an indifference to exact scientific theory and rather a willingness to take
good moral teac.hing as his own, regardless of the quarter from
which it came. 66
As Teuffel puts it,
He started from the Stoic system but in him
its barren austerity was toned down, the harshness
softened, its crotchets·laid aside; nor did he disdain additions from the other systems.o7
seneca had a genial and tolerant nature which made it most agreeable for him to become a sort of pluralist.

He was little able

to tolerate general admonitions which were irrevocable, but
rather made up his world from his own personal investigations and
ideas. 68
He would address his followers n~ Stoica lingua,~
hac submissiore.n 69

He considered himself a thorough-going
Stoic,7° an ingenious and virtuous philosopher. 71
Nevertheless
he makes it plain that he does not want to be bound by this

65. De Vita Beata, xiii, 1.
lxvi, 47.
66. John W. Basore, nseneca's Moral Essays", in Loeb
Classical Library (Cambridge: The University Press,
1935). vol. i, intro.
67. Miller, op. cit., intro.
68. R.M. Gummere, Seneca the Philosopher and His Modern
Message, (Boston: Marshall Jones Co.,-r92~p. 5o.
69. ~· xiii, 4.
70. De Tranquillitate Animi, i, 10.
71. F.W. Farrar, Seekers after~' (London:---, 1874}.
p. 161.
!E_. cvi, 2.
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school exclusively: "Nullius nomen fero."

72

In general, he

would not be in complete obeisance to any of his predecessors;
be could feel this way about it, for heresy is not a word in the
vocabulary of philosophy.73
The bitter feud which waged through the ages between the
stoics and Epicureans might serve to illustrate the tenacity
with which these schools maintained their respective points of
view.

And therefore, we can but admire the open-minded view

taken by Seneca when he repeatedly quotes Epicurus as the authority for a point he is making.74

He explains this liberal view

of the matter, saying that he intends to praise the dicta of all
schools:
Ut scias quam benigni simus, propositum est
aliena laudare; Epicuri est aut Metrodori aut alicuius ex illa officina. ~t quid interest quid
dixerit? Omnibus dixit.75
Seneca maintains that those who "in verba iurant

~

quid dicatur

aestimant," should realize that whatever has been said well
should be regarded as "communis".76
And in another letter he

72. ~· xlv, 4.
73. F.L. Lucas, Seneca and Elizabethan Tragedy, (Cambridge:
The University Press, 1922). p. 47~
74. ~· xvii, 11 (on wealth).
~· xviii, 14 (on anger).
~· xx, 9, (on Poverty).
~· xxv, 5, (on sincerity).
~· xxii, 5, (on danger).
75. ~· xiv, 17.
76. ~· xii, 11.
~· xiii, 8.
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tellS us that he is wont to cross into the enemy's camp, not as a
deserter but as a scout, "soleo enim et in aliena castra tran-

sir~,

-

.!!,2!!

tamquam transtuga, sed tamquam explorator.n77

His

t olerant attitude leads him to condemn any type ot complete men-

tal slavery to the opinions ot others.

He definitely makes this

point, when he writes to Lucilius: "Primum exponam, quid Stoicis
videatur: deinde ~dicere sententiam audebo ••• Ego ~idem
78
sentio."
Earlier, Seneca had written that even if the Stoics
did revere their masters in the past, "non sumus sub rege; sibi
79
auisque ~ vindicat.n
Fo~he notes, it a man always follows
the opinions ot one person, his place is not in the senate house
but out among the anarchists, "quoniam si quia semper unius se80
iqui tur, ~ in curia sed in facti one est. •
As

evidenced in his works, Seneca was possessed ot a mind

quick and brilliant, but not sure or thorough in its conclusions.
~ile

his system of eclecticism may appear reasonable, it was

certainly not consistently workable either in theory or in practice.

True, it was practicable in the sense of its being mate-

rialistic and utilitarian in outlook; but its want ot logic in
arrangement, its failure to be universally applicable, its lack

ot psychological appeal, make Seneca's philosophy less easy to

77. !E.. ii' 5.
78. ~· cxvii, 1.
79. !2· xxxiii, 4.
80. De Otio, iii, 1.
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describe and actually use, than to understand. 81

When he at-

tempted to make his teaching applicable to his own every day
life, he fell far short of even approximating his goal, and the
inconsistency led him beyond all question into serious errors
82
which deeply compromise his character.
After we have culled a uniform system of thought from
seneca's volumes of moral instructions, we find too often little
conviction in the admonitions he sets forth.

Claiming the priv-

ilege to legislate for himself, he grants the same benefit to
others.

While this procedure might indicate openness of mind and

consideration for the differences of opinion, the implied assertion is that there actually is no certain standard of truth, that
philosophic findings are entirely subjective, that is, depending
entirely on just what a person wishes to find.

In theiilSelves

~enecan

instructions are perhaps unequalled among pagan works in
~atural goodness and virtue. 8 3
The Apostle of the Gentiles, the greatest of the Christian
was haunted by the dread, as he put it, "lest having
preached to others I myself became a castaway.ff 84
It was, per-

~reachers,

81. Francis Holland, Seneca, (London: Longmans, Green
and Company, 1920). p. 164.
82. Ferrar, op. cit., p. 34.
83. J.W. Mackail, Latin Literature, (Chicago, Ill.:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923). p. 174.
Ferrar, op. cit., intro. p. 5.
84. I Cor. ix, 27.
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haps, his humility and candid admission of frailty that saved
him•

Seneca, however, was less humble and, as a result, less

consistent.

For when his morals have been reduced to practice,

hiS deeds continually belie his own preaching: a eulogist of
freedom and the tutor of a tyrant; a decrier of courtiers and
yet never leaving the Palatine himself; one condemning flatterers
yet author of the most debasing adulation of Messalina and Claudius' freedman; the enemy of riches and yet the possessor of over
fifteen million dollars. 85
In Seneca we witness a man whose life was a tragic failure;
this, because in the opposite of Dante's sense, he had not trained himself to make "great refusals". 86
The principle which led
to his spiritual degradation was moral compromise.

In a preca-

rious position at the court of Nero, he endeavored to work on the
principle of encouraging what was wrong in the vain hope of preventing something worse.
rible disaster.

He did succeed in staving off the ter-

The delay, however, did but add to the intensity

of the flame once it broke out.

Fearful of the danger to his own

life, as also of the other consequences in adhering to the path
of righteousness, Seneca cleverly avoided distasteful issues.
Clever he was indeed, but less clever he had proved a good deal

85. Lucas, op. cit.,
86. Ibid., p. 52

p. 45.
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•ore edifying.

87

•

As the most fluent, tolerant and persuasive of Roman instructors of morals, Seneca demonstrated in the trying crises of
hiS life how hard it was to be brave, consistent or even free
from crime under the mad despotism of a Caligula, a Claudius, or
a Nero. 88
While he prided himself as being a gifted philosopher, he undertook the impossible task of living as an upright
man89

and pursuing the course of a statesman under the Caesars~

More than most people he desired to do the correct thing, but it
was in his nature to hate more than most other people the unpleasant things, especially unpleasantness with other people.91

By not taking the lofty line of duty that Zeno would have taken,
seneca permitted the element of expediency to be the standard of
his conduct, rather than to hold to obligation regardless of the
outcome.

No man ever gained anything but contempt and ruin by

continually wavering between two opinions.

Mr. Froude well de-

lineated the character of Seneca, when he refers us to Bunyan's
Pilgrim's Progress:
Of all unsuccessful men, in every shape,
whether divine or human or devilish, there is none
equal to Bunyan's Mr. Facing-both-ways--the fellow
with one eye on heaven and one on earth--who sin-

87. Ibid., p. 45.
Lucas, op. cit.,
88. "Seneca," in Warner's Library of the World's Best
Literature, p. 13119.
-- --89. ~· cvi, 2.
90. De Otio, 1, 4.
91. Lucas;-op. cit., p. 45.

~----------------------------------------------------2-,6
cerely preaches one thing and sincerely does another, and from the intensity of his unreality is
unable either to see or feel the contradiction.
He is substantially trying to cheat both God and
the devil, and is in reality only cheating himself
and his neighbors. This of all characters upon the
earth appears to us to be the one of which there is
no hope at all.92
Lucas writes that Seneca had
power could carry.n93

~ore

intellect than his will-

Seneca, with his moral acrobatics and

supple complaisance, presents himself to us as an inconsistent
teacher of right living.

His life and doctrines are unintel-

ligible save in the light of his political background.

92. Ferrar, op. cit.,
93. Lucas, op. cit.,

163
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OHAPI'ER IV

SENECA'S CONCEPTION OF GOD
When Seneca counselled Lucilius to investigate "quae ~
teria sit dei," 94 we may rightfully assume that he was in sincere quest of the fundamental source of life and being.

In old

age, he repeated the necessity of knowing God when he wrote that
man will never make real progress until he has the right idea of
God, "numquam satis profectum erit, nisi qualem debet deum mente
oonceperit ••• "95

A statement such as either of the ones just

quoted shows by far a greater depth of intellect, indicative
perhaps of a real earnestness of purpose, than one in which he
refers to the heavenly bodies as divinities, "paucorum motus
comprehendimus, innumerabiles ~ longiusque ~ conspectu seducti di eunt redeunt."9 6
Here Seneca does but follow the ancient
theory of the Stoics that the stars were so many gods.

His ac-

tual convictions on the subject of divinity are rather difficult
to analyze in so far as his works contain many conflicting references pertaining to the deity.

First let us see how nearly

Seneca came to truth in his theological vagaries.
his pagan explanations will be brought out.

Afterwards

From a considera-

tion of these two elements, we shall try to come to some con-

94. De Brevitate Vitae, xix, 1.
95. !E.· xcv, 48.
96. De Beneficiis, iv, 23, 4.
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elusion as to just what conception he had of the Divinity.
Some of the eminent doctors of the early Church speak admiringly of the erudition and apparent Christian sentiments expressed by Seneca. He is quoted by Tertullian, 97 and by Lactantius.

Even St. Augustine refers in many places to Seneca and
thiS in an approving manner.9 8
Lactantius is, perhaps, the most
pointed when he says that Seneca speaks "as one of us":
He was the sharpest of all the Stoics. How
great a veneration has he for the Almighty. And
how many other things does this heathen speak of
God, like one of us.99
Now it is safe to state that these encomiums are lavished
on Seneca solely by reason of his expressions of reverence for
God.

His entire code of morality evidences nothing more than

good sense, practicality, expediency; it wants in its entirety
any semblance of a supernatural motive.

Seneca strikes the key-

note of one of the natural proofs of the existence of God, when
~e

says that even in our very souls there is that unlearned

~owledge,

or better perhaps, that unlearned realization of the

existence of a Supreme Being.

While this innate respect and rev-

ence for Divinity exists in every man, still the words of Seneca

97. Tertullian, Apologetica, x~~. (not extant)
98. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Lib. v, Cap. vii, ix.
Ibid., Lib. ix,-cap. iv.
--Ibid., Lib. vi, Cap. x.
Ibid., Lib. vi, Cap. xi.
99. Divinae Institutiones, Lib. i, Cap. l.
Cf. Tertullian, De Anima.
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give a definite expression to the fact that he is so impelled,
ttanimum tuum quadam religionis suspicione percutiet.n 100

-

As

to acknowledging the true, living God, Seneca comes

verY near to orthodox theology in such remarks as "it is God who
bas set free the oxen throughout the earth;" 101 "it is God, our
Master, who draws forth ••• ;"102 "God is worshipped by those who
The Deity is termed the "artifex divinus", designer or the universe.l 04

knOW

Him."l03

Almost in Scriptural phrasing, Seneca affirms the omnipresence of God in the vast expanses or the universe: "Q,uooumque
ibi illum videbis ooourrentem tibi;
-te flexeris, -vacat, opus~ ipse implet~"l05

nihil ab illo

--

The Christian doctrine of

•God within us" might possibly be construed in the words "et
socii sumus eius (dei) et membra."106
The soul of man must be
in a ri tting condition "purus .!.£ sanctus, •• or there is no room
for God: "Q,uis sit summi boni locus quaeris? Animus. Hie nisi
purus .!.£ sanctus est deum ~ capit." 107
And another instance:
"Prope est .! te deus, tecum est intus est.
sacer intra .!!.2!! spiritus sedet ••• Bonus

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

~· xli, 3.
De Benericiis, iv, 6, 5.
Ibid., iv, 6, 1.
~· xcv, 48.
~· cxiii, 16.
De Beneficiis, iv, 8,2.
~· xcii, 30.
!£• lxxxvii, 21.

Ita dico, Luoili:

~vir

sine deo

~
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"108
In the same letter he applies Virgil's words to comest•
plate his own thoughts, "In unoquoque virorum. bonorum 'Q.uis deus

;:::.;;;--

incertum est, habitat deus.'"l09

Conversely, but as definitely

in accord with Christian teaching, a soul without God is in a
bad state: "Deus ad homines venit, immo quod propius, in homines
venit; nulla sine deo ~bona est."110

-

Omniscience is an attribute of the Almighty by virtue of

which He knows all things, even our inmost thoughts.

Seneca

seems to recognize this secret Witness and Judge of our conduct.
"~uid

enim prodest ab homine aliquid

clusum est.

~

secretum?

Nihil deo

Interest animis nostris et cogitationibus mediis

interveni t. "lll

And again when he warns: ~ta dico, Lucili:

sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos.
ipse tractat."112

Hie prout

~

nobis tractatus est, ita E£!

Divine Providence is recognized in terms worthy of one of
the Great Fathers, "God also has given certain gifts to the
whole human race, and from these no man is shut out," (Deus quo-

108.

109.
110.
111.
112.

~·

xli, 2.
Cf. Nat. Q.uaes. ii, x, 3.
Cf. Chas. P. Parker, ffSacer Intra Nos Spiritus," in
Harvard studies in Classical Philology, vol. xvii.
~· xli, 2.
Cf. Naturales Quaestiones, x, 3.
Cf. Aeneid, viii, 352.
~· lxxiii, 16.
~· lxxxiii, 2.
~· xli, 2.

-
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_g,uaedam munera universe humane generi dedit, !. quibus excluditur nemo). 11 3 He tells Lucilius to consider always the bless~

ings of our heavenly Father, "proinde, quisquis ~ ••• cogita quan114
~ hobis tribuerit parens noster."
And also in this passage:
"9,.Uidquid nobis bono futurum erat, deus et parens noster in pro115
~ posuit."
Seneca even defends Divine Providence against
the accusation of the Epicurean Lucilius, that the number of
evils in the world proves the want of' a just, guiding hand:
~uaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ista, si providentia mundus regeretur, multa bonis viris mala
acciderent. Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur, cum praeesse universis providentiam probaremus et interesse nobis deum.llb

To prove our fidelity in the way of' righteousness, it often
seems good to God to try us, and this, as Christian doctrine
teaches, because He loves us.

Seneca gives one Christian expla-

nation for suffering in saying that God greatly loving the good
(deus bonorum amantissimus), wishes them to become strong in
~irtue

(illos optimos atque excellentissimos vult), sends the

just many trials to exercise them (f'ortunam illis cum qua ~
ceantur adsignat). 117 He seems to express this point in a
]_arallel manner: "Patrium deus habet adversus bonos viros animum

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

De Beneficiis, iv, 28, 3.
Ibid., ii, 29, 4.
~· ex, 10.
De Providentia, i, 1.
Ibid., ii, 7.
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I

-

et illos fortiter amat

~

'operibus,' inquit, 'doloribus, damnis

e xagitentur, ut verum colligant robur.•n118

-views and disciplines those "quos amat."119

God hardens, reAnd he says that

he has trained his will to obey God submissively in the trials
and troubles of life: "In omnibus, quae adversa videntur et dura,
120
"Ex animo
sic tormatus ~: ~ pareo ~' sed adsentior."
illum, ~ quia necesse est, sequor.n121
It would be well for

-

Lucilius to recognize His guiding hand also: "Optimum est pati,
Q.uod emandare .!!£!!. possis, et deum quo auctore ouncta proveniunt,
A truly worthy gem is found in
sine murmuratione comitari.n 122
a passage where Seneca says true freedom means serving God, "Deo

parere libertas est.n 123

Summing up man's moral responsibili-

ties, "habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: 'Deum sequere.'ttl24

We cannot help drawing attention here to the likeness

of the same sentiment so often expressed in Holy Scripture. The
125
Old Testament abounds
in admonitions similar to this pagan

118. De Providentia, ii, 6.
119. Ibid., iv, 7.
120. Ibid., v, 7.
121. Ibid., v, 7.
~· xcvi,
2.
122. ~· cvii, 9.
123. De Vita Beata, xv, 6.
124. Ibi~xv, 6.
Boethius (De Consolatione, i, 4.) credits this maxim
to Pythagoras. Cicero to one of the Seven Sages (De
Finibus, iii, 22; iv.}.
125. Ct. Ps. xxiii, 6.
Ps. xxvi, 8.
Ps. l:xviii, 33.
Ps. cvi, 4.
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dictum.

Even a greater similarity is noticeable in the words of

the son of God Himself, when He invites us, "veni, sequere

~;" 126 as also those of His apostles who were glad to reply,
•et secuti sumus te."
-----

Now did Seneca stop here, he surely could be taken for one

o! the Christian apologists.

But we hasten to add that the re-

semblance, however striking, between Senecan phrases and Christian literature is nothing but a marvelous coincidence.

As

in-

dicative of his credence in the true God or as having accurate
conceptions of His nature, the apparent Christian phrases of
should bear no more weight than his prophecy concerning
~he discovery of the great New World. 127 He states both ideas
~eneca

~ith

the same attitude of uncertainty and as being up to the

~pinion

of anyone considering the subjects.

In his system of

eclectic thought each subject was something novel and, as far as
~e

could see, about as possible as the grata dicta made by other

philosophers.

His expressions of belief in God must not be taken
The crux of the issue
for more than they are actually worth. 128

would be: are his ideas, his spirit, Christian?
and explanation of the word

~

His definition

will throw considerable light on

just what he revered in the divinity.

126. Matt. xix, 21.
127. Mad. 370.
128. C.T. Cruttwell, A History of Roman Literature, (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886). p. 388.
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Seneca's various meanings for the word deus include the
following:
versi tt; 129

a) ff{Deus), mundus cuncta complectens rectorque unib) ffSic ~ Naturam .!.Q£!!, Fatum, Fortunam; omnia

eiusdem dei nomina sunt varia utentis ~ potestate";l30 c) more

-in a pantheistic line, he says that "when you say Nature,

you

merely give another name to God, for Nature is God and the Divine Reason that pervades the whole universe and all its parts:
you may call him 'Iovem

Optimum~

Maximum,' 'Tonantem et Stato-

-

rem,' 'Liberum Patrem,' 'Herculem,' 'Mercurium,• and even if you
name Him 'Fatum,' ·~ mentieris.•n1 31
In fine, "any name that
you choose will be properly applied to Him if it connotes soae
force that operates in the domain of heaven--His titles may be as
countless as His benefits." 1 32
His inquiries into the nature and activity of God give
somewhat of an introduction to the pantheistic and at times agnostic theories which he entertained concerning the Divinity.

~e

must seek to discover what God is; whether He gazes indiffer-

ently and without concern upon the works of His creation or
actually controls them. 1 33
Possibly in a moment of sadness
Seneca chose to adopt the negative thesis as indicated by such

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

De Vita Beata, viii, 4.
De Benefic11s, iv, 8, 3.
Ibid., iv, 7, 1.
Ibid., iv, 8, 3.
De Otio, iv, 2.

rlr
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statements as, God is unconcerned about us and turns His back on
the world; that our good deeds mean no more to Him than our
railure to pursue virtue. 1 34
That his God did not exist as a

personality, is clearly brought out in both the sense and grammatical construction of such expressions as: "Nempe universa ~
materia et!! deo constant ••• ~uod tacit, quod est deus •••• n 135

-The word "quod" can be rendered only as "that which", possibly

in the sense of "whatever it is which"; in any case a definitely
neuter term indicative of a non-intelligent material force.
That Seneca's theories on the existence of the true God
did not hold his own complete faith is clearly brought out in
the many rather unconscious references he makes to the "gods".
The word "unconscious" is used here in the sense that although
as an individual thinker he had delineated many of the attributes
of the true God, Seneca was for all practical purposes strongly
imbued with, and subconsciously in accord with all pagan conceptions of the plurality of gods.

The "dii immortales" of almost

every Latin writer antedating the complete triumph of Christianity, is a common expression throughout Seneca's works.

If we are

cautioned to keep in mind the "vetus praeceptum: 'deum seque1""'
e ' "l
~'

36 we are a 1 so t o1 d t h at the man who so instructs us in

134. De Beneficiis, iv, 4, 1.
135. ~· lxv, 24.
136. De Vita Beata, xv, 6.
Cf. ante, p. 31.
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rlrguing the case for the gods, "causam deorum agam."l37
seneca tells us that "parens noster", and

"~",

If

and "provi-

dentia" is the custodian of man's welfare, he likewise says that

~n

is indebted to "dis" for the "salutem, vitam, et spiritum.J3

8

-

"Deus" is worshipped by those who know Him, Seneca succinctly
reminds us, but in fewer than a score of lines further on, we
learn that "(Di) ••• nocere ~ possunt. Nee accipere iniuriam
_g,ueunt nee facere." 139
"Pater~", God our Father, may try
our faithfulness by sufferings so we are taught; later the object of our reverence has taken on a plural aspect, "ceterum
castigant quosdam et coercent et inrogant poenas et aliquando
specie boni puniunt." 140
Egoism is, in fact, at the bottom of most of his precepts
and theories.

He admits, it is true, that there exists something

which, if not superior to man is at least, out of the sphere of
human life, and he calls it by the abstract term, "deus".

As

has been noted, he predicated supreme attributes to this being.
~till,

Seneca says that a good man differs from deus only in the

element of time, "immo etiam necessitudo et similitude, quoniam
141 It will be made
~uidem bonus tempore tantum ~ deo differt."

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

De Providentia, i, 1.
De Beneficiis, ii, 30.
~. xcv, 48, 49.
Ibid., xcv, 50.
De Providentia, i, 6.
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olear later, how Seneca opines that suicide "promittit ut parem
... f ac1a
. t , n142 a more boas tf u1 assurance than any other sys t em
deO

-

o f philosophy attempted to make.

He may refer to the "maiestatem", and the "bonitatem", ot 11 qui praesident mundo,n 1 43 but we
144
must also know that, "sapiens .£:!:!!!!dis ~pari vivit."
Far

----

from the humble attitude of a Christian, in his relations with
the Creator, Seneca assumes the attitude of socius in his rela145
tions with God.
Seneca tells us that the best way to worship the gods is
to believe in them to acknowledge their majesty and goodness, to
imitate them. 146
Far otherwise are his sentiments, quoted by
St. Augustine, from Seneca's lost work, Contra Superstitionem:
All these things, a wise man will observe
for the law's sake, more than for the god's; and
all this rabble of deities which the superstition
of ages has gathered together, we are in such manner to adore, as to consider the worship to be
rather matter of custom than of conscience.l47
Commenting hereon, St. Augustine says: "This illustrious

142.
143.
144.
145.

~·
~·
~·
~·

lxxxviii,
xcv, 50.
lix, 14.
liii, 11.
De Providentia, vi, 6.
Ibid., I, 5, 7.
146. Ep. xcv, 50.
147. "Contra Superstitionem", in De Civitate Dei,
St. Augustine, Lib. vi, Cap.-ro.
---

rr
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senator worshipped what he disapproved, acted what he disliked,

~d adored what he condemned.nl48

Fabius remarked that it was

a great pity that he who could what he would did not always make
the best choice.

It were perhaps more correctly stated that he

who could do what he would, would not always make the best
choice.
Did Seneca consider this "sequere deum" 149

sufficiently

important, he certainly would not have permitted himself to lapse
into such glaring inconsistencies.
~ecurs

to the subject gives us the impression that he aspired to

the truth.

~ow

The frequency with which he

But as was noted earlier in this work, Seneca

was the typical Roman thinker, fearful of the consequences of
discovering truth; realizing the necessity of following logical
ponvictions to their obvious conclusions and lacking the will~ower

to do so; and in general, handicapped by the first premise

pf an ergo that had to be reached.

This latter was at all times

to be governed by that bane of any upright standard of life, expediency.
~nd

He was correct in his conviction that mere thoughts

dialectics on the subjects of the deity, purpose of life,

etc., must be reduced to practice, or they meant nothing at all
other than whiling away one's time on idle fancies.

But seneca

148. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Lib. vi, Cap. 10.
149. De Vita Beata, xv, 7.
Ct. ante, p. Jl, J4.
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erred in throttling his own mental powers by making them subservient to convenient living.

His thoughts must accomodate

themselves to his actions--his deeds were made answerable to no
ethical standard of morality.
sions.

His was a system full of conces-
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CHAPrER V
SENECA'S IDEAS OF THE HUMAN SOUL

In studying the human soul, Seneca begins by saying that
the soul "animus" of man is a living being, "animal", using the
latter ter.m in its generic sense.

He says the soul is living

because it effects our own existence as living beings, "ipse
efficiat ut simus animalia"; 150 that it is from the root word
•anima" that the term soul (animal, which means a living being)
takes its source, "~ ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint.n 151
continuing to describe the essence of the soul, Seneca launches
into arguments widely divergent in meaning.
~ith

In strict accord

the tenets of the school of Epicurus, which maintained that

the soul was composed of minute particles, atoms, diffused
through the body152--in other words that the soul was one with
the body--Seneca says with questionable logic, «quae corporis
bona sunt,

corpora~:

corpus est.nl53

ergo et quae animi

~·

Nam et hoc

The fact that the bodily goods are material

because they are appreciated by the material body, in no wise
proves Seneca's "ergo"; the misplaced second premise and the conclusion are dissociated from the first premise.

150. ~· cxiii, 2.
151. Ibid., cxiii, 2.
152. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, iii.
153. ~· cvi, 4-5.

His "nam" phrase
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is purely a gratum dictum, an assertion and nothing more.

Con-

tinuing, Seneca says man's good must be corporeal, since man
himself is corporeal--"bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit,
!Pse sit corporalis.nl54

~

From these two citations it is evi-

dent that Seneca affirms the material composition of the soul-he doesn't prove it as he pretends to do.
!!l,"l55

"Animus corpus

is exactly what he intends to say.

in his own assertions?

Did Seneca believe

Was he himself convinced that he had

proved the corporeal existence of the soul?

This is hardly pos-

sible in view of the position he maintains throughout most of
his works.

Why then did he argue in the aforementioned vein?

Judging from the inconsistencies appearing throughout the length
and breadth of his philosophical teaching, we may assume that
Seneca herein merely states an hypothesis.

As in the case of

his entire system, Seneca endeavors to prove actually nothing.
Independent of the masters of philosophy as we have seen him
above,l56

he composed his own credo--and allowed the same priv-

ilege to others.
Most of Senecan teachings on the composition and nature of
the human soul are found in the treatise Ad Marciam de Consolatione.

Therein he analizes the soul of man, and attributes to

154. ~· cvi, 5.
155. ~· cvi, 4.
156. Cf. ante, p. 18 ff.
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it activity and quality which can be possessed only by a spiritual or immaterial substance.

First of all he gives us an inti-

mation of the pre-existence ot the soul before its union with
the body.

Once released, he tells us, from the weight of earth-

lY dross (the body), the soul flies back ("revolant") more
lightly to the place of its origin

(~ores

ad originem

~};5?

Again he says that the soul after death will be "restored to its
tirst state," in integrum restitui, 1 58 "unde demissus est.n159
It is nature that has bestowed on man his soul, or "entrusted it
160
to man" (natura quae prior nobis credidit),
and Seneca asks
concerning death, what hardship should it be in returning to the
place from whence one has come, "reverti ~ veneris quid grave
est?" 161
The soul animates the body, resides in 'it as in the
darkness ot gross matter and as something held therein by chains,
162
"cetera ••• vincula animorum tenebraeque ~·"
Out of its
natural element, presumably the immaterial world ot spirit, the
soul is "crushed strangled, and stained" as it resides in the
body, and is "kept tar .from its true and natural sphere,"
(obruitur, ottocatur, inticitur, arcetur a veris et suis in
falsa coiectus). 16 3
The souls ot men find no joy lingering in

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxiii, 1.
Ibid., xxii--,3.
Ibid., xxiv, 5.
De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 3.
Ibid., xi, 4.
Ad Marciam de Conso1atione, xxiv, 5.
Ibid., xxiv:-5.

4.3
chafe against the narrow bounds or the
bOdY,

"~

umquam magnis ingenis

~

inoorpore

~

est; e:x:ire

atgue erumpere gestiunt, aegre has angustias ferunt,n 164

-

as

theY strive to attain the liberty and freedom or the universe to

which they are accustomed, •vagi per

~'

sublimes. et

~

alto

Adsueti humana despioere." 165
In man Seneca speaks or the soul as
est." 166

-

"~

pars quae melior

That property or a man which can neither be given

away nor taken away by another--"guod proprium hominis estn 16 7__
is his rational soul, "animus et ratio in animo.n

168 .

Man's

thinking apparatus is his soul, for "rationale enim antmal est
homo.n 169

-

164.
165.
166.
167.

Ad Marciam de Consolatione, :x::x:iii, 2.
Ibid., :x::x:iii, 2.
De Constantia Sapientis, vi, .3.
~· xli, 8.
168. Ibid., :x:li, 8.
169. Ibid., xli, 8.
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CHAPTER VI
SENECA ANALl"ZES CONSCIENCE

Closely allied with the subject of the nature of the soul
of man is that faculty of the soul we term "conscience".

Nowhere

in the writing of antiquity has this inward voice of approval or
condemnation been so graphically described, in itself and in its
operations, as in the works of Seneca.

Strange paradox as it may

seem, Seneca maintains in no uncertain terms that we are accountable to conscience for the actions we perform.

He implies the

existence of conscience when he says there are some benefits that
have a value even greater than life itself, "quaedam beneficia

~ maiora vita."l70

But there must be some judge who passes

verdict on the relative values of the beneficia, and since what
is good for one person is not necessarily good for another, this
judge must be a personal arbiter, hence conscience.

Nature has

implanted within each one of us first of all a knowledge of what
she orders, and then the conscious realization of the obligation
of obeying these commands.

We have an ingrained loathing for

that which Nature has condemned, "infixa nobis eius rei aversatio

~' quam natura damnavit."l7l

This inward light of correct

living sees and passes judgment on both what we have done and

170. De Beneficiis, iii, x, 3.
171. ~· xcvii, 16.
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what we intend to do, noiroumspexit quaeque fecit quaeque facturus est.u 1 72
And this inward judge has the attribute of never

-being deceived,

"numquam fallitur.ul73

The man who has drained the cup of iniquity, who has so
imbibed of the poison of wickedness that sin is part of his very
nature, 174 can have peace neither with himself nor with his
fellow men.

Conscience reveals him to himself and convicts him,

ncoarguit illum conscientia et ipsum sibi ostendit.ul75

Good

luck may free many from the punishment they have merited, but it
spares no man the fear of retribution, ttmultos fortuna liberat
poena, metu neiminem. u1 76
And while many crimes may of their
nature evade the law (multa scelera legem effugiunt),

none can

flee the reproach of conscience.

For it is the nature of guilt
to be in fear, "proprium autem est nocentium trepidare.u177 Constant fear, constant terror and distrust of one's own security

follow inevitably the path of the wrong-doer.

We must agree,

says Seneca, that ttmala facinora conscientia flagellari et pluriilli tormentorum ~ !2, quod perpetua illam sollicitudo
A man lashed by an evil conscience may
urget ~ verberat.n 1 78

~

seek and find a place of safety, but never peace of mind, "tutum

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

De Clementia, xiii, 3.
De Brevitate Vitae, x, 3.
De Ira, 1, xv1, 2-4.
~· xcvii, 16.
Ibid., xcvii, 15.
Ibid., xcvii, 16.
Ibid., xcvii, 15.

-
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aligua ~ ••• praestat, nulla securum."l79
Asleep, he is trou~ed "inter somnos movetur"; 180 and in his waking hours he is
more hateful to himself than he is to others, "invisior sibi quam
servientibus."181 He lives in terror of death, "saepe mortem
timet", 182 but still he longs to be freed from the "conscientiae

-

-tormentas" and prays for death to come. 183

Such phrases, in-

deed, clearly bear witness to the tact that a pagan must have
endured a type of living agony in pursuit of vice, and must have
stilled the voice of conscience by the more horrible alternative
of completely steeping himself in wickedness.

The incomparable

force with which Seneca depicts the operations of this internal
custodian of Nature's laws, permits of the well-founded assumption that in his life at the court of the Caesars, Seneca himself
must have experienced these moral headaches time and again.

As terrible as are the reproaches of conscience, so great
are the joys of its approving nod.

He does great things, main-

tains Seneca, who teaches how secure and tree is the blessing or
a good conscience, "quam tutum gratuitumque bonum sit bona
scientia.n184

~

If it is the fate of a wicked man to wish death

that he might be freed from the internal stings of his soul, so

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

~·

cv, 8.
Ibid., cv, 8.
De Clementia, xiii, 3.
Ibid., xiii, 3.
Ibid., xiii, 3.
De Ira, i, xvi, 3-4.
184. De Trinquillitate Animi, iii, 4.

-
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bY the same token we must realize the value of peace of mind.

It

is preferable to even life itself, "~ potior !11 tamquam ~
185
Whereas a bad conscience seeks to hide itself and
~·" .
suffers anxiety even in solitude, a good conscience gladly wel186
comes the crowd, "bona conscientia turbam advocat.ff
Death, as it actually approaches, presents a harrowing
spectacle for those troubled with fear for their evil deeds.
They endeavor to direct their thoughts away from their many illspent hours, and their multiplied vices.

If they review the

past, at once the wickedness of their lives comes before them
with its accompanying reproach.

Only those can look back fear-

lessly whose acts have been subjected to the censorship of conscience, "omnia acta aunt sub censura ~.n

187

On the other

hand, Seneca tells us that at death one can bear witness to himself that he has loved a good conscience and all good endeavor,
Htestatus exibo bonam m! eonscientiam amasse bona studia.n 188
Then indeed such a man is following the path towards the gods,
Had deos iter faciet.ff 189

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

De Beneticiis, i, xi, 4.

~-

xliii,

5.

De Brevitate Vitae, x, 3.
De Vita Beata, xx, 5.
Ibid., xx, 5.
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CHAP!'ER VII

VIRTUE AND THE SUMMUM BONUM OF SENECAN PHILOSOPHY
Though he differs radically with Stoic thought on many aspects of the soul, Seneca is strictly in accord with orthodox
teaching concerning the summum bonum of man.

Preliminary to his

discussion of right living, Seneca tells us that ffnunc veritatem
••• guaerimusff, 190 that the two strong supports of the soul are
trust in the truth and confidence,

ff~!!!

animo dant, fides veri et fiducia."l9l

plurimum roboris

Happiness is out of the

question tor one who has been thrust outside the pale or truth,
•extra veritatem proiectus.n 1 9 2
In tine "unless I could attain
the truth, it were not worth being born," he writes. 19.3
"It takes the whole of life to learn how to live,n 194

he

says, and he pities the rabble which flows along in a sort of
mechanical existence "nesciens vivere.nl95

In a number or

beautiful phrases Seneca admonishes us to live life to the fullest.

It happens, he says, that often a man very old in years

has no evidence to prove that he has lived long, save his wrinkles and gray hair. 1 96
Such a man has not lived long (vixit),

190.
191.
192.
19.3.
194.
195.
196.

De Otio, iii, 1.
!E.· "XCCv' 46.
De Vita Beata, v, 2.
Naturales Quaestiones, praef.
De Brevitate Vitae, vii, J.
Ad Marc1am de Consolatione, x, 4.
De Tranquiliitate Animi, iii, 8.
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he has existed long (fuit);

he has done not much voyaging (na-

vigavit), but much tossing about (iactatus ~). 197

-

Consider

a man worth as much as his virtue; do not inquire how old he is,
Long life is
"incipe virtutibus illum ~ annis aestimare.n1 98

-

not an essential for intrinsic worth, for just as a man of small
stature may be a perfect man, so in a few years of life one may
attain not the furthermost, but the most important goal.l99

For

as Seneca mused in his own waning years, it another year were
added to lite, "fuisset simile praeterito.n 200
A full life is
really a long life, regardless of how short a span ot years it
may include.

The thing to be striven for is not to live long

but to live rightly.

As a matter of tact, this is the only ele-

ment we have in our control; to live long one depends on Fate
201
only; to live rightly, on his own sou1.
Perhaps it was with
a sardonic smile that Seneca in his old age mused over the gross
inconsistency between his own lofty ideals and his weak-kneed
failure to live according to principle: "The point is not how
long you live, but how nobly you live.

And often this living

nobly means that you cannot live long" (quam bene vivas refert
The
J!2.!! guam diu; saepe autem in .!!Q.Q_ est bene, a! diu). 202

Brevitate Vitae, vii, 10.
Marciam de Consolatione, xxiv, 1.
~. xciii, 8.
1Ul· lxx, 12.
~ Beneifciis, v, xvii, 2-7.
200. 1m,. :x:ci , 8.
201. Ibid., xciii, 2.
202. ~· ci, 15.

197.
198.
199.

~

~
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life of a dissolute is really not life at all.

Seneca tells us

of Heraclitus who wept bitterly on seeing the wretched death
203
(~O male pereuntium).
And he quotes Curius Dentatus as
"preferring to be a dead man than a live one dead; for the worst
of all ills is to leave the number of the living before you die"
quam vivere; ultimum malorum est
.
. i s ) • 204
mero ex1re,
ant eguam mor1ar
(!!~mortuum

~

vivorum ,£!!-

==----

Beginning the subject of living to the fullest, Seneca
writes that life "nee bonum £!£ malum

~;

boni !£. mali locus

that it is neither a good nor an evil but a place where
both good and evil exist, and it is up to each individual to set
his own standards.

He tells us, WWe must set before our eyes the

goal of the supreme good, towards which we may strive, and to
which all our acts and words may have reference--just as sailors
must guide their course according to a certain star.

Life with-

out ideals is erratic: as soon as an ideal is to be set up, doctrines begin to be necessary":
Proponamus oportet finem summi boni, ad quem nitamur, ad quem omne factum nostrum dictumque respiciat; veluti navigantibus ad aliquod sidus
derigendus est cursus. Vita sine proposito vaga
est: quod si utique proposendum est, incipiunt
necessaria esse decreta.2 b
Then comes the "decreta".

The epitome of Stoic perfection was

203. ~ Ira, ii, 10, 5.
204. De Tranguillitate An.imi, v, 5.
205. ~· xcix, 12.
206. ~· xcv, 45, 46.
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•living according to nature," the preservation or harmony or
soul, "concordia animi. 20 7
One who adhered to this principle in
all the situations or lire possessed "virtus".

The following are

tb.e general definitions and qualifications of' a virtuous soul:
••• ordinatissimus
-decore ••• sanus ••• inperturbatus,adtollent
intrepidus ••• f'ortuita
•asperis blandisque

quem~

~

~

-

depri-

such a soul is virtue itself', "talis animus virtus

But Seneca does not mean to imply that a virtuous man
"Again and
is insensible to hardships, "~ sentit illa.n 20 9
again, I must remind you," he writes, "that I am speaking not of'
tb.e ideal wise man, but or the man who with all his imperfections
desires to follow the perfect path (honestam viam), and yet has
passions that are often reluctant to obey.n 210
This man rises
•calm and unmoved" (quietus placidusque) to meet whatever assails
No proof' of' virtue is ever mild, "numquam virtutis molle
documentum est." 211
He counts the struggle entailed, as mere
212
training, "omnia adversa exercitationes putat.n
And if' one
him.

be

lashed and torn by Fortune, he should look upon himself' not

as the object of' the cruelty of' the Fates, but rather as engag-

-

207. De Benef'iciis, iv, 25, 1.
De Otio, v, 1.
De Vita Beata, viii, 6.
208. ~· lxvi, 6.
209. De Providentia, 1i, 2.
210. De Benef'iciis, 1i, xvii1, 4.
211. De Providentia, iv, 12.
212. Ibid., 1i, 2.
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ing in a struggle, "quod quo saepius adierimus, fortiores erimus.n213

Disaster is virtue's opportunity, "calamitas virtutis

----~ccasio ~.n

21

4

Another aspect of bearing up with life is its
shortness of duration, "magno animo brevia feramus incommoda;" 21 5

tor we are no sooner engrossed in the struggle than death is upon
us, "mortalitas aderit.n 216

Such in summary are the divers

descriptions of a virtuous man.
attain the "happy life"
~osse constare.n 21 7

(~

ego

Only such a man can be said to
~

virtute nego beatam vitam

Those are mistaken who claim the events of life are either
good or evil.

Rather it is the soul in its ability to rise supe-

rior to the vicissitudes of existence, that can turn these events
into a happy or a miserable life:
Errant enim, qui aut boni aliquid nobis aut malum
iudicant tribuere Fortunam; ••• Valentior enim omni
fortuna animus est et in utramque partem ipse res
suas dycit beataeque ac miserae vitae sibi causa
est.218
It is the power of the soul to remain unconquerable; to stay aloof, as it were, "invicta vis animi,n 219 amid earthly surroundings; to endure for the sake of tantum
~atientiam,

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

praemium--"~

advocabimus

quos tantum praemium expectat, felicia animi immota

Providentia, iv, 12.
Ibid., iv, 6.
~ Ira, i1i, 43, 5.
Ibid., iii, 43, 5.
De Beneficiis, iv, 2, J.
!2· xcviii, 2.
De Vita Beata, iv, 2.
~
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220
tranaul."llitas • n

-

The mind must experience no interruption of
joy, "!!!.£. adtollens!:!.! um.guam nee depremens." 221
This is the

•vita
beata" of the Stoics. Stated otherwise we have the "secu..;...;-~a aspiciat" 222 attitude of the soul in the midst of the great

---

00mmotions

of nature around it; the

"~

idemque inter diver-

!!n223 definition of the immota cited above. This "vita
.beata"
; ;. . ; . .-. ,;. .; .;.
incidentally, is quite inclusive, graced as it is with "perpetua
libertas; et nullius~ hominis ~ dei timor." 224
The virtue so well delineated, is the only immortal thing
which falls to man's lot, "hoc ~ contingit immortale mortali"225
Some of the more concrete or practical aspects of virbus.

~

tue are brought out when Seneca says that the virtuous man finds
joy only in the present, and puts no trust whatever in the tuture, in so much as whoever leans on uncertainties can bave no
sure aupport. 226
We gather that the summum bonum he had been
speaking of, is immortale because it is an abstract quantity,

220. ~ ~. i i i 12, 6.
221 • Q! Tranqui litate Animi, ii, 4.
.!E_. xli, 4.
De Beneficiis, iv, 1, 2.
De Constantia Sapientis, v, 5.
IJe Vita Beata, iv, J.
Ibid., viii, 2.
222. De Constantia Sapientis, vi, J.
22) • Ibid., vi, J.
224. .!E.· xvii, 6.
225. JfE.. xcviii, 9.
De Vita Beata, viii, 4.
226. De Beneticiis, vii, ii, 4.

-
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tberefore has no personality, and hence cannot be subject to
When he uses phrases as "such a soul is virtue itselfn
or nGod is virtue," he apparently means to attribute to the ani~us
:;;;o.--

and deus the abstract qualities of goodness; and since the

latter is just that, a quality, it has no material existence and
bence is not subject to the laws of life and death.

And in

reverse order he seems to think of "virtus" as possessing the
animate existence of that to which it has been attributed.

The

tact that he deems the virtuous intention as immortale, but the
uous deed or the manifestation of this intention as des
recognition than the mere passing sensation of having
experienced pleasure--is brought out in his answer to Lucilius'
question: "Interrogas, quid petam

~virtute?

habet melius, ipsa pretium sui." 22 7

Ipsam.

Nihil

Virtue itself is its

reward.

Moreover, the true joy of a good man (sapiens) come
from within himself, "~ ~ ~ gaudium peteret,n 228 for he has
everything invested within himself, nomnia in~ reposuit.n 22 9
Virtue establishes a friendship between the gods and men, he
, giving us to understand that there is some sort of relaour good deeds and the supernatural element. 2 3°

-

Seneca says that "nulli non virtus et vivo et mortuo ret-

---

227.
228.
229.
230.

De
Ad
De
De

Vita Beata, ix, 4.
He!Viam de Consolatione, v, 1.
Constantia Sapientis, v, 4.
Providentia, i, 5.
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tulit gratiam," 231

~

we can hardly assume that the "virtus mortua

-

rettulit gratiam" has reference to heaven or remuneration in the

l ife hereafter for the good one has done here in mortal exist232
In view of his general attitude on the subject,
ence.

seneca merely wants to indicate the good name one will leave behind him, the reputation and example of having been a «vir sapi-

--

ens et virtuosus."
Taking strong issue with the Epicureans who would have

their summum bonum consist in well-satisfied appetites during a
life interspersed with a good deal of otium, this champion of
stoic rigidity severely criticizes their desire for pleasure.
"Voluptas fragilis est, brevis ••• in qua nihil est magnificum aut
suod naturam hominis ••• deceat.n 233
He protests against the
"virtus" by the Epicureans in connection with the idea of pleasure.

Virtue despises pleasure, treats it as an enemy, and recoils from it as far as it can. 2 34
We learn that the "pleasurefl
(voluptas) means only bodily satisfactions, when Seneca says

that all our happiness should not be placed "!!!. carnen, because
"bona illa sunt ~ quae ratio dat.n 2 35 He does say, however,
truly but as if it were a rather sheepish admission, that ttwhat-

231. !£• lxxix, 18.
232. Of. post, 93 f.
233. De Beneficiis, vii, ii, 3.
234. Ibid., iv, ii, 4.
235. ~· lxxiv, 16.
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ever fortune should send my way will turn

o~t

for the best, but

I prefer that what befalls me should be the more pleasant and
agreeable things, and those which will be less troublesome to
manage." 236
Which may indicate one of two things. It might
mean, in the first place, that he was willing to accept both the
good and the hard things of life and would make the best out of
them, although it were just human nature to find it easier to
accept the more enjoyable happenings.

On the other hand it might

illustrate that while all his teaching on how to live and be a
happy man by the practice of natural virtue, was a good thing in
itself, nevertheless, there were circumstances when it would be
greatly to his advantage to act otherwise.

From all indications,

it was quite definitely the latter view that Seneca took when he
preferred the "faciliora !£ iucundiora"; for he tells us quite
bluntly, and more in accord with the spirit of Senecan than of
the Stoic philosophy, that we should "observe and avoid long before it happens, anything that is likely to do us harm," (quodcumque laesurum est, multo ante quam accidat, speculare et averte).237
The opposite of virtue is evil.

Having seen in what

Seneca's virtue consisted, we might describe with considerable
accuracy his ideas of evil.

In dealing with the subject of evil,

236. De Vita Beata, xxv, 5.
237. ~.-xcYiii, 7.
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however, he is quite brief and holds opinions which are in complete accord with Scholastic philosophy.

All vices, says Seneca,

rebel against nature, they are a violation of the established
order, "omnia vitia contra naturam pugnant, omnia debitum ordinEIIl
deserunt," 238 which is about as sage an expression as one will

--

find among pagan moralists.

He repeats the idea, but lends

rorce to it by a contrast with the good order of virtue: "virtus
vcundum naturam est, vitia inimica et infesta sunt.n 2 39
.And
while there is "consensus atque unitas" where virtue is present,
"dissident vitia". 24°
If man depends on his worst qualities to
make him enjoy life, his will be a storm-tossed career full of
uneasiness; 241 "such is the tyranny under which that man must
live who surrenders to the bondage of any passion" {in tyrannide
illi vivendum est in alicuius adfectus venienti servitutem). 242
A sort of "particular examen" is advocated by Seneca for the
correction of personal failings, "hoc mihi satis est, cotidie
aliguid ~ vitiis meis demere et errores meos objurgare.n 243
While the idea is laudable, we venture to say it is not suggested as the result of Seneca's experience.

The daily elimination

of one fault is too optimistic a view of Seneca's will-power--

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

!£• cxxii, 5.
!£· 1, 9.

De Vita Beata, viii, 6.
cr. post, p. 67.
De Ira, i, x, 2.
De Vita Beata, xvii, 3.

-
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anybody's for that matter.
At its best the virtue of Seneca consists in an attitude
of haughty, proud superiority in receiving the various conditions with which man's existence is frought.

"Contemnite", is

the mental attitude advised, whether we be confronted with
ttdolorem", "paupertatem" or in general any type of "fortunan. 24 4
The fear of death seems to be the only thing Seneca had difficulty in conquering.

But, he says, "once we have death in our

own power, we are in the power of nothing"

(~

p_otestate, ~~in nostra potestate sit). 245

sumus in ullius

"Ferte fortiter,"246 he tells us, and from being equal to the gods, 247
you will even surpass them, "hoc est guo deum antecedatis.n 248

244. De Providentia, vi, 6-8.
245. Ep. xci, 21.
De Providentia, vi, 6-8.
246. Ibid., vi, 6-8.
247. !E.· xli, 4.
248. De Providentia, vi, 6.
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CH.API'ER VIII
SENECA LIVING LIFE IN VIEW OF DEATH
Almost in Scriptural figure Seneca queries with reference
to man: "Q,uid est homo?"

He is but a vessel so frail that the

slightest jar will break (quolibet quassu!!! et quolibet fragile
iactatu). 249
Everything connected with human existence is

-short-lived and perishable, and is of its nature of temporary

duration, (omnia humana brevia et caduca sunt et infiniti temSeneca terms life the most
~oris nullam partem occupantia). 2 5°
precious thing in the world

(~

pretiosissima), and condemns

men for trifling with it and consuming it with frivolous pursuits.

Often we fail to appreciate life as we should because it

is an incorporeal thing, because sub oculos non venit, and for
this reason "vilissima aestimatur, immo paene nullum eius pretium
~." 2 5 1

Life is short, but even this short time allotted to us

rushes by with such speed that at the end but few find they have
really lived. 2 52
Life is short, but we make it so; nor do we
have any lack of it, but are wasteful of it. 253
"Vita brevis,
etiam si dies noctesque bonae menti laboremus.n 2 54

Even should

we recall to mind the ages of men who have lived the longest and

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xi,
Ibid., xxi,~.
De Brevitate Vitae, viii, 1.
Ibid., i, 1.
Ibid., i, 4.
De Vita Beata, i, 2.

J.

--
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in recalling them, desire such a lengthy existence, Seneca re~inds

us in this reverie that,
cum ad omne tempus dimiseris animum, nulla erit
illa brevissimi longissimique aevi differentia,
si inspecto quanto quis vi~~rit spatio comparaveris quanto non vixerit.Zj}
·
Just what does one look forward to when thinking of death?

This is what Seneca queries; and in his cold, material search

tor the answer, he opines that it is merely the final termination in a succession of events.

The major portion of death has

already passed, in so much as our past years are now in the hands
of death. 256
Why should one's last hour be said to bring death,
when in reality it merely completes the death process?

It is not

the last drop that empties the water-clock, but all that which
previously has flowed out.

True, we reach death at that last
~oment, but we have been on the way a long time. 2 57 Death wears
us away, but it does not whirl us away, ncarpit ~ illa, ~
corrinit.n 2 58
His phrase, "~vita nihil aliud quam ad mortEm
~ est,n 259 sums up the journey aspect of life. 260 We have
been placed on earth "ad brevissimum tempus," and should view our
~tay as a sojourn at an inn. 261 "Tacita labetur": 262 thus our

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxi, 3.
2. -~· xxiv, 20, 21.
~- cxx, 18.
Ad Polybium de Consolatione, xi, 1.
~· xcix, 7.-Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxi, 1.
De Brevitate-vitae, viii, 5.
Cf. Virgil, Georgics, iii, 66 Seq.

~- i,
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life will glide along.
00 urse;

It will neither reverse nor check its

nor will it remind one of its swiftness.

The passing of

our life-span will stop neither at the command of a king nor at
the applause of the populace.

As it started on the first day, so

it will run along; nowhere will it turn aside, nowhere will it
delay.263
Another view Seneca would take of our life-span is that of
a good which has been loaned us.

The wise man, he tells us,

lives as one who has been lent to himself and·who will return
everything without sorrow when it is reclaimed.

His possessions,
even his personal faculties have been given him on sufferance. 264

our dear ones are granted to us not as permanent possessions but
at loan. 265
Some of these blessings which adorn life's stage
will be recalled on the first day, others on the second, while
others we shall be permitted to use till the end.

Everything is

tor our use and enjoyment, but it must be r~embered that all is
subject to change and return to nature. 266
In describing death, Seneca becomes truly picturesque in
many of his expressions.

The general theme is well summed up in

his Epistle referring to life as being a preparation for death.
Though wanting in the supernatural element, the passage is in

263.
264.
265.
266.

De
De
Ad
Ad

Brevitate Vitae, viii, 5.
Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 1.
Polybium de Consolatione, x, 4.
Marciam De Consolatione, x, 2.
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. substance thoroughly Christian.

We quote:

As the mother's womb holds us for ten months,
making us ready, not for the womb itself, but for
the existence into which we seem to be sent forth
when at last we are fitted to draw breath and live
in the open; just so, throughout the years extending between infancy and old age, we are making ourselves ready for another birth. A different beginning, a different condition awaits us. We cannot
yet, except at rare intervals, endure the light of
heaven; therefore, look forward without fearing to
that appointed hour,--the last hour of the body but
not of the soul. Survey everything that lies about
you, as if it were luggage in a guest-chamber. You
must travel on. Nature strips you as bare at your
departure as at your entrance. You may take away
no more than you brought in; what is more, you must
throw away the major portion of that which you
brought with you--that which has been your last
protection; you will be stripped of the flesh, and
lose the blood which is suffused and circulated
through your body; you will be stripped of bones
and sinews, t~g framework of these transitory and
feeble parts. 7
Therefore to live life in view of death, this is what
seneca would admonish us to do.

And while death is on the one
hand the most certain of human destinies, 268 on the other hand

nothing could be more uncertain as to its actual approach.

He

cautions us to profit by the .time granted us "sine dilatione",
for no promise has been given of this night, "nay, even for this
hour" (nihil de hodierna nocte promittitur--nimis magnam advocationem dedi--, nihil de hac hora.

267.
268.

~·

!£.

cii, 23.
lxvi, 42-43.

Festinandum est, instatur a

~rgg_).

269

Remorseless Fate has assigned a limit to the lives

of us all, but none of us knows how near he is to this limit.
seneca warns us concerning death that, "hodie fieri potest,
~icguid umguam potest"; 27° whatever can happen at any time can
happen today.

It is easy to dispense an amount that is assign-

ed, no matter how small it is; 271

but since there is no fixed

count of our years, our present life must be guarded more carefully since it may fail we know not when. 2 72

Hence let us so

order our minds as if we had come to the very end, "sic itaque
:f'ormemus animum, tamquam ad extrema ventum sit.

~·"273

Nihil differa-

Daily, let us check our accounts, "cotidie .£!!!!!vita

Baria faciamus"; 274

and let us so live that nothing that can

happen shall be unexpected. 275

And if God should be pleased to

add another day we shall welcome it with glad hearts.

That man

is happiest, and is secure in his own possession of himself, who
can await the morrow without apprehension.

When a man has said,

"I have lived!", every morning he arises he receives a bonus:
Crastinum si adiecerit deus, laeti recipiamus.

269. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, x, 4.
Ad

Polfbium~e

Consolatione, ix, 9.

270. ~· lx1ii, 107
271. De Brevitate Vitae, viii, 3.
272. Ep. xxvi, 7.
!E_. lxxiv, 3.
273. !E_. ci, 7.
274. Ibid., ci, 7.
275. De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 6.

Ille beatissimus est et securus sui possesor, qui
crastinum sine sollicitudine expectat. Quisquis
dixit "vixit," cotidie ad lucrum surgit.Z7o
The wise man who has used his life to the fullest, who has not
squandered any of it by neglect or wasteful living, will not
hesitate to go to meet death with steady step. 277
Seneca's ideas on the subject of life in view of death can
perhaps best be illustrated by the description he gives of his
own standards of living:
I am endeavoring to live every day as if it
were a complete life. I do not indeed snatch it
up as if it were my last; I do regard it, however,
as if it might even be my last. The present letter
is written to you with this in mind--as if death
were about to call me away in the very act of writing. I am ready to depart, and I shall enjoy life
just because I am not over-anxious as to the future
date of my departure.278

276. ~· xii, 9.
277. De Brevitate Vitae, xi, 2.
278. Ep. lxi, 2.

65
CHAPTER IX
SENECA'S THOUGHTS ON DEATH

We have seen in detail the philosophy which governed the
life of Seneca, his motivating ideals (theory and practice), his
attitude towards the Source of life in the universe, and his realization of the superior part of man's essence, the soul.

A

thorough understanding of these fundamental principles as influencing Seneca is necessary, before it is possible to get an intimate view of his mind on the subject of death.

If he recog-

nizes a God to Whom we are responsible for our deeds, doubtless
he will also recognize some standard of morality, to the observance of which some definite sanction is attached.

Should his

God be totally indifferent to the material world, our deeds will
be accountable only to ourselves for sanction.
If Seneca's summum bonum is attained while man is in exis
ence on earth, then death will mean little other than the cessation of this good and man's passing into oblivion.

Pleasure,

depending on his point of view, is what every philosopher sought.
Entirely contingent on his theses concerning God, the existence
of the soul, and its nature, did each of them formulate codes of
virtue and catalogues of vice.

A standard of life which sought

none other than present physical well-being would naturally delineate virtue as a purely convenient quality.

Vice on the

other hand, was said to be evil only in so far as it entailed
suffering.

Each, virtue and vice, would contain its own imme-
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diate reward or punishment.

In fine it was necessary to investi-

gate and discover just what conscious relations Seneca had with
the spiritual or immaterial world.

This we have done; now we

shall endeavor to describe his position on th& subjects of death,
existence after death and immortality.
Perhaps the strongest natural instinct in man is the love
of his own life, his eagerness to continue in existence.

To pro-

mote the realization of this craving, man has also been endowed
with an innate urge to self-preservation.

Only the gaining of a

more valuable possession as proposed by the mind can influence
man to disregard this natural law to insure his physical wellbeing.

That such a good may exist is distinctly implied in

seneca's question pertaining to blessings greater than life:
"Quid quod quaedam vitae beneficia sunt et maiora vita?« 279
says that as regards the libertas, pudicitia,

and~

He

bona (a

good conscience), we are indeed able to live without them, but
that death becomes preferable, "sine quibus possumus quidem vi~' sed ut ~ potior sit." 280
It is more honorable to meet
death in the line of duty than by avoiding it to prove traitors
to our cause:

viri est% ••• ~ praemia proditionis ingen~ ostendantur praemium fidei mortem concupiscere." 281 But
"~uanti

279. De Beneficiis, iii, x, ).
280. Ibid., i, xi, 4.
281. Ibid., iii, xxv, 1.
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the inherent worth of such goods can only be enhanced by the
well-nigh supreme value that has been placed on them.

It is,

therefore, the universal testimony of mankind in all ages and all
places that bears out this precept of the natural law that man
endeavors to protect his life.

And in proportion as man is im-

pelled to the desire of continued life, so is he stricken with
that fear of all fears, the dread of ceasing to live--the fear
of death.

And since the urge to live is supplanted only by the

recognition of a higher good, so the fear of death is alleviated
solely by the appreciation one conceives for a greater benefit
to be obtained in dying.
In his accounts of the last moments of life and explanations of the certainty of death with its accompanying uncertain
elements, Seneca uses terms that are as keen in perception and
beautiful in analysis as any others written in Latin.

Few if

any of the poets have as realistically described death as Seneca,
and at the same time maintained his beauty of expression.

Did

he have the ideals of Christianity to permeate the purely natural
outlook he takes, Seneca would, indeed, rank among the literary
lights of the Christian Church.

Many of his expressions bear a

remarkable parallel to the words of Holy Scripture; but rather
than indicate any Christian influence on Seneca, they serve but
to illustrate how the Church applies the supernatural viewpoint
to many of the natural events of life, how she merely directs
them to their supernatural end.

l

Seneca's discussions on death

68
include: a) living one's life in preparedness for death; b) man's
natural love of existence; c) the fear of death and the efforts
man would take to avoid this event; d) the certainty of death as
alsO the uncertainty of its time and circumstances; e) the lack
of discrimination death shows towards youth or age; f) whether
death be a good or an evil; g) suicide; h) and continued existence after death.

The subject will be studied in topics in the

order mentioned.
Throughout the writings of Seneca there is no other
thought which more persistently recurs than the subject of death
and life hereafter.

The thought impresses the reader that re-

gardless of what matter Seneca may be dealing with, there inevitably creeps into the discussion death, as though it were the
pervading element of the topic.

Which fact illustrates the con-

tention that Seneca was a deep-thinking man who saw and realized
long ahead of time the final mortality which awaits the things of
earth.

There is no one so ignorant as not to know we must some-

time die, he wrote, "~ tam imperitus est, ut nesciat quandoque
moriendum." 282
This fact also brings out, in spite of his multiplied arguments to the contrary, that while the many disagreeable situations of life could be forestalled or meliorated (even
by the sacrifice of principles), and that while dread of consequences for this or that action might be rationalized-away, still

282.

~·

lxxvii, 11.
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that terrible, inexplainable, but positive fear of death seemed
mockingly to triumph over all his philosophizing. 28 3 So definitely is this the case that Seneca tells us that once we have
the rear of death in our power, we shall even surpass the
gods. 28 4
And, therefore, save in the one instance we have
quoted when a greater good than self-preservation is proposed to
the mind, his one remedy for this fear is ffmortem contemnere." 28 5
Like a man frightened out or his senses going through an old
mansion, he would reassure himself by shouting, laughing at the
thing feared, in the attempt to deceive himself that it was by a
nothing that he had been frightened, ffnosmet ipsi fallamus.ff 28 6

"I shall look upon death as a comedy with the same expression of
countenance," says Seneca, in the attempt to conceal his actual
fear. 28 7 Endeavoring to dismiss with a shrug of the shoulders
the natural dread of death, Seneca says that death is after all

an insignificant trifle over which men unduly trouble themselves,
."minimum. est, de quo sollici tissime agi tur. ff 288
He says the
fear of death is the bane of one's existence, the curse which
lays a curse on everything else, ffmiserrimus

~

283. De Beneficiis, v, xvii, 2-7.
284. cr. ante, pp. 35, 55.
!E.· xli, 4.
De Providentia, vi, 6.
285. ~· xxxvi, 8.
286. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 1.
287. De Vita Beata, xx, 3.
288~ Ep. xciii, 12.

miserrima omnia
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efficiens metus mortis.n 289

-

In line with a more natural point of view he asks if there
iS anyone who doesn't shrink from departure from life, 29° and

replies to his own query in answering that "animos nostros
offendat.n 291
He shows a remarkable keenness of perception in

-analyzing the fear of dying experienced by a man stricken with
disease.

"Dread of death does not come from your disease," he

writes, "that is a fear of nature" (hoc ~ dicam, !!2.!!, morbi
292
hunc esse sed naturae metum).
With regard to those in old

----

age, ill health, or other circumstances which would indicate the
proximity of death, Seneca says that knowing in a more realistic
manner that they must die, "nesciat quandoque moriendum,n 293
•
they nevertheless turn to flight, tremble and lament, "tamen cum
prope accessit, tergiversatur, tremit, plorat.n 294
Indeed,

when the mask is removed, the Stoic or Senecan mask of indifference, it is found that everyone has this innate fear of death,
"quemcumque vis occupa, adulescentem senem medium; invenies
que timidum mortis, aegue inscium vitae.n295

289. ~· ci, 10.
290. De Beneficiis, v, xvii, 2.
291. Ep. xxxvi, 8.
292. ~· lxxviii, 6-7.
293. ~· lxxvii, 11.
294. Ibid., lxxvii, 11.
De Brevitate Vitae, xi, 1.
295. ~· xxii, 14.

~

In fact the very

71
rear of dying is often the psychological cause of men's deaths,
296
"§.aepe enim causa moriendi est timide mori."
This fear of
death is the cause of the greatest discontent among men, "illa
y::ro maxima ex omni mortalium populo turba miserorum, quam
E.ectatio mortis exagitat undique inpendens." 297

.!_!-

Thus it is throughout the length and breadth of his commentaries on death; the underlying reason for all his explanations, admonitions and words of counsel is to remove this overshadowing fear of death.

Seneca was superior to his age in so

much as he did not live entirely for the present.

True, he

tells us to live in the present, for we can rely on nothing in
the future; but far from revealing his own conviction in the
matter, it illustrates how he is trying to explain away his own
conception of the ultimate passing of all things.

In so much as

he could not forecast the future, its uncertainty held a sort of
dread for him; hence, he more stringently disciplined himself to
be indifferent to whatever might arise.

In one frank statement,

he implies the extent of this fear when says that a man in his
hour of death requires tenacious courage of soul, and this only
the wise man can manifest, "at illa, quae in propinquo est utisue ventura, disiderant lentam animi firmitatem, quae est rarior

296. De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 5.
297~ ~· lxxiv, J.
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]Otest nisi~ sapiente praestari." 298
The cause of this fear of death is rightfully recognized by
seneca as being man's desire to live.

At no time does he deny

the natural clinging to life evidenced by the extreme measures
one takes to preserve it.

But since in nourishing this desire

one must also face the realization and consequent fear of approaching death, Seneca would have us try to be indifferent
towards life itself.

Rather than have the pleasure of living

th the dread of dying, he would sacrifice the former in the
deavor to dismiss the latter.

There is only one chain which

binds us to life, he tells us, and that chain is the love we

tor life; this chain may not be cast off, but it may be rubbed
est catena, quae B£! alligatos tenet, ~vitae, qui
~ est abiciendus, ita minuendus est.n 299
In almost Scho-

away,

"~

lastic phrasing we are told that nature has molded our souls so
that they naturally love their own existence, "animos ••• quos in

1:=~~

sui natura formavit,"300

and that all men tend to pre-

"sicut feruntur omnes ad conservation
Seneca makes a graphic as well as accurate comparison
he likens a man clinging to life to a person being carried

298.

~·

x:x::x, 8.
l:x::xvii, 11.
299.
:x::xvi, 10.
300. !£• x:x::xvi, 9.
301. Ibid., x:x::xvi, 9.
~·
~·
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40wn a rushing stream trying to catch hold of the briars and
snarp rocks as he is swept downward, "multi !!£ conplectuntur et

tenen~, quomodo qui aqua torrente rapiuntur spinas et aspera.n3° 2
~

seems anxious to live long; then when people are well up

~veryone

in years, they try to stave off the thought of death by deceiving
themselves that they are much younger,
Vide quam cupiant diu vivere! Decrepiti
senes paucorum annorum accessionem votis mendicant; minores natu se ipsos esse fingunt; mendacio sibi blandiuntur et t~ libenter se fallunt
quam si una fata decipiant.JU3
~

death approaches, man greatly fears and endeavors to avoid

it.304
~al

And still, while so accurately testifying to man's nat-

desire to live, the many admonitions he gives us on how to

~egard

death are all for the purpose of overcoming this desire.

Seneca would sacrifice the love of life that he might be somewhat
treed of the fear of its loss.

Such a procedure is hardly living

"secundum naturam", but it does go towards making death less
dreadful.

Epistle CI, takes up the laments of Maecenas as he is

on his death bed.

The great patron had written that he would

gladly suffer prolonged physical pain, were his death but postponed awhile.
~aecenas,

Seneca heaps scorn on this cringing prayer of

saying after a bit of severe criticism, that Maecenas

302. ~· iv, 5.
303. De Brevitate Vitae, xi, 1.
304. !£• lxxvii, 11.

--
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seemed to think that in asking for continued suffering he were
actually seeking a continuance of life, "optatur et tamquam

~

R!titur supplici ~.n305
Granted that the love of life is natural, that the fear of
death is natural, it must be remembered it was in Seneca's philosophy to desire that which entailed the least suffering and inconvenience.

What, therefore, would be his attitude towards this

tear of closing life, what would be his remedy for this situation?

The attempt to rid oneself of the tear of death is two-

told in its nature.

The first part consists in an attempt to

deceive oneself as to the nature of death, laugh at it, scorn the
idea that death can subdue man; and the second is an attempt to
appeal to logic and cold reason that since death has been decreed
for us, it should be accepted with Stoic gravity, with no more or
less disturbance ot soul than any other event which comes our
way.
"Nam ~ illam bene rexit nisi qui contemserat.n3° 6
Thus sums up Seneca his own mental attitude toward death.

He

knew not what was beyond; he felt that there would be something
to meet, but he was sure only of the past and of the present.
Therefore, this Roman pragmatist would follow his own advice and

305. ~· ci, 12.
306. ~· cxi, 5.

l

take care of everything in his power, lite and death.
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What lay

beyond was out ot the sphere ot his eminently practical mind.
tt~o mortem eodem voltu comoediamque videbo"307

would be his ex-

pression on his own death bed. He who tears death will never do
anything worthy of a man. 308
"Contemne mortem," 309 he tells us
and once you have overcome the fear of death there is no sorrow
in lite, "Nihil triste est, ~ huius metum ettugimus."3lO
The highlight of Stoic morality was the living according
to nature, but as we have so often seen Seneca interprets Stoicism to mean rather the recognition ot the laws ot nature in
man's regard and the adapting oneself to these laws so as to
bring about the least painful experiences.

Senecan morality in

no wise cautions us to observe the laws of nature for the sake of
objective righteousness.

We have seen that both in theory and

practice he adapted principles to circumstances rather than make
his standard of rectitude hold good regardless of circumstances.
That Seneca was aware of the tact that there existed an objective standard of truth, and likewise that he tully realized
the grave inconsistencies between his own lite and such a standard, is evidenced in his analysis of the mental attitude of a man

307. De Vita Beata, xx, 3.
308. De Tr'aiiquilli tate Animi, xi, 6.
309. Ep. xxxvi, 8.
~· lxxviii, 5.
310. ~· lxxviii, 5-6.
Bp. xci, 21.
~· xxx,
3.

l
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on his death bed.

In such circumstances, one draws up his will

as an "in~orruptum iudicem.n3ll

Never do we wrestle more in

making decisions than when with death staring us in the face;
with all self-interest banished (remotis utilitatibus), only the
ideal of good remains before our eyes (solum ante oculos honestum
312
stetit).
We dispose of our material goods in a disinterested
manner--perhaps for the first time--after seeking those most worthy of inheriting our possession, "quaerimus dignissimos".

For

now what difference does it make to whom we give since no one
will make us any return?, "quid enim interest, quibus demus
nullo recepturi?"3l3

~

Implied herein is Seneca's confession that

his life was guided by such motives as the "utilitas", and the
principle of acting for personal gain alone.

These phrases like-

wise carry Seneca's implied condemnation of such a manner of
life.
On the subject of death, it has been noted that Seneca goes
to great length endeavoring either to do away with the fear of
death or to acquire the courage necessary to bear this affliction
commendably.

Recalling one of the general tenets of his system,

we remember the word of advice he gave to Lucilius: "Observe and
avoid long before it happens, anything that is likely to do you
harm" ( quodcumque laesurum est, multo ante quam accidat

311. De Beneficiis, iv, xi, 5.
312. Ibid., 1V, Xi, 4.
313. Ibid., iv, xi, 4.

l

s~eculare
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et averte). 314

---all

The inevitability of death preoccupied seneca

his life, much of which was spent in avoiding this very ob-

vious "quod laesurum est".

Whatever may be said of Seneca's in-

consistency in his teachings, he must be given credit for facing
the truth.

If an- unpleasant condition arose, he surely endeav-

ored to get around it some way or another; but unlike the incredulous of today, Seneca in hi.s saner moments refused to deny the
existence of conditions such as they are.

It is foolish to fear

death, he says, since men simply must await what is sure.
should fear only what is uncertain,

"~uam

They

ideo timere dementia

~' quia certa expectantur, dubia metuuntur.n3l5

Our minds

must be ever in readiness, never fearing "id quod necesse est,"
but always ready for whatever may be (quod incertum est).316
Seneca becomes truly poetic and certainly uses the clearest of
logic in discussing the certainty of death.
"Morti natus ~,n3l7

completely tells us what was in

Seneca's mind concerning the end of man.
under which man comes into the world.

This is the condition

Parents know this; and if

with this knowledge they still bring forth children, they must be
reconciled to the fact that they are the remote instruments of
placing their offspring in the path of death.3lS

314. ~. xcviiii 7.
315. ~. xxx, 1 •
316. AU Polybium de Consolatione, xi, 3.
317. U9 Tran~uillitate Ariimi, i, 13.
318. An Marc~am de Consolatione, xvii, 7.
Ad Polybium de Consolatione, xi, 3.
L

For mortals

-

78

can but beget their like: "Mortalis nata

~'

mortales peperi-

--

Our death is proclaimed at our birth, "~ enim illi
d enuntiata nascenti est,n3 20 and everyone who is privileged to
be born is destined to die, "cui nasci contigit, mori restat.n3 21
sti.n319

Whoever complains about the death of anyone, is merely complaining that he was a man, "(flet) quisquis aliquem queritur mortuum
For life has been granted us
esse, gueritur hominem fuisse."3 22

----

only on the condition that we must die.

Therefore, he who would

find fault with death, cannot wish to have lived, "vivere noluit,
sui mori non vult,n3 2 3 since no one is able to be born without
paying the penalty for being human, "nulli contigit impune
ci."324

~-

And, indeed, amid the turmoil of earthly pursuits,

nothing is certain regarding man save the fact that he will die:
"in tanta volutatione rerum humanarum nihil cuiquam nisi mors
certum est.n 325
Some people think that in living longer this continuance of
life enables them to avoid death.
young person as being premature.

They look upon the death of a
There is strictly speaking no

319. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xi, 1.
320. Ibid., x, 5-.321. ~· xcix, 8.
De Beneficiis, iii, xxxi, 2.
De Tranquillitate Animi, xi, 6.
322. Ep. xcix, 8.
323. !E· xxx, 10.
324. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xv, 4.
Ad Polybium de Consolatione, xi, 3.
Ibid., i, 1.
325. ~· xcix, 9.
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such thing as a premature death, and no matter how a person lives
ne cannot escape the inevitable lot of man. 326
Moreover death
is no respecter of persons whether as pert~ins to age3 27 or station in life. 328

Neither are we summoned according to our rating on the censor's list, "rum citamur ~ censu."3 29
With keen insight into the psychology of the mind, Seneca
tells those who are ill that "you will die not because you are
ill, but because you are alive; even when you have been cured,
the same end awaits you; when you have recovered, it will, not be

death but ill health, that you have escaped" (morieris,
aegrotas, sed quia vivis.

Ista te

~

et sanatum manet;

valueris, ~mortem, sed valetudinem effugies).330

~

quia

~

.£.2,£-

Death has
'

its fixed rule equal and unavoidable, "aeguam et 1nvictam."33l
Associating the supernatural element with the subject of
death, Seneca would give the impression that the divinity, his
Fata or Natura, has previous knowledge of the circumstances of
the death of everyone, and has fixed the time limit of each one's

326.

~·

xciii, 12.
Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xi, 5.
Ep. xii, 6.327. !£• lxvi, 42.
Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxi, 6.
Ep. xxvi , 7-;328. De Brevitate Vitae, viii, 5.
329. ~· xii, 6.
330. !£• lxxviii, 6.
331. !£. xxx, 11.
~· lxvi, 43.
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span of life.

To suppose that the duration of man's life were

controlled merely by blind chance, that the death of the young,
unexpected deaths and the like happened for no reason at all, was
just too much for the faith which dwelt in the breast of Pagan
seneca.

His writings illustrate the fact that he felt someone

01

something controlled the number of man's years.
He quotes Demetrius when the latter addressed the gods,

~

immortales, vultis spiritum.?

Q,uidni? Nullam. moram faoiam, quo
nimis recipiatis quod dedistis.n33 2
In saying nFata nos du-

------

-cunt," Seneca again attributes to the supernatural element the

faculty of guiding the destinies of man, and he says that it was

settled at the first hour of birth what length of time remains
for each.333

Throughout our life, the Fates ply their work and

keep us from being conscious that we are dying, so that death may
steal upon us the more easily.

As infancy changes into boyhood,

boyhood into adolescence, followed by old age, death is always
with us, lurking under the name of life.334

In coming into life

we have entered "in regnum fortunae", and since she governs the
length of our days, "durum atgue invictumn is her law.335
Seneca consoles Polybius on the death of his brother saying that

332. De Providentia, v, 5.
333. Ibid., v, 7.
Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xii, 4.
334. Ibid., xxi, 6.
335. Ibid., x, 6.
l
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while "rerum natura illum tibi dedit," 336

still nature has made

it clear that she exempts no one from her stern law, "natura
nulli ~ necessitatis ~ gratiam facturam ~testata est.n337

-

The termination of life is just where the remorseless law of
rate has fixed it, "ubi illum inexorabilis fatorum necessitas
fixit,n33 8 and all prayers and struggles, "vota ~ studia,"
spent in trying to avoid death, "frustra sunt."339

At birth

the-time limit of each one's life is fixed, hence no one dies
too soon since he lives only as long as he was destined to live;
he has filled his capacity for living.340
~ pervenit ad aevi,n34l

ment.

Virgil's "Metasque

is the authority for Seneca's state-

While he continuously dwells on the inevitability of

death, throughout there is a tone of respect for the divinity as
the master of the final disposition of man on earth.

There is

the intimation of an intelligent being directing man's destiny.
In one place Seneca states that, "now is the time for you
to reflect, not only that all things are mortal, but also that
their mortality is subject to no fixed law.n34 2
And again:

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Ad Polybium de Consolations, x, 4.
Ibid., xi, 1.
~· ci, 7.
Ad Marciam de Consolations, xxi, 6.
Ibid., xxi,~.
Ibid., xxi, 6.
De Providentia, v, 7.
Ep. ci, 7.
341. Aeneid, x, 472.
342. ~· lxiii, 16.
l
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«there is no fixed count of our years." 343

These statements

seem in direct variance with all we have been told concerning the
nfiXUS terminus cuique,"

"naturae lege."

"~consilio,"

In it-

self the inconsistency would fall right in line with the many
discrepancies found in Senecan arguments, but unlike many others,
this difficulty is readily explained.

The "incerta lege" or

Epistle UIII, is "incerta" only in so far as man is concerned.
We live, not knowing when the last hour will come upon us.

But

the implied contention is that subjective ignorance on our part
has nothing to do with the objective existence or a law governing
the length or time each individual shall live.
From a philosophical point of view the fact of death, the
cessation or life, seems to have raised many questions in the
mind or Seneca.

~ors quid est?"344

lows with his own answer.

he asks, and shortly fol-

Death is either the end or a process

of change, "aut finis aut transitus.n345

In any case Seneca

rightfully judges that it is not a state or existence or a condition: "Mors ad te venit; timenda erat, si

tecum~

sed necesse est aut~ perveniat aut transeat.n346
and has passed.

posset;

It occurs

Then there arises the obvious problem as with

all things pertinent to the existence of man, is death a good or
an evil?

Seneca here presumes to convince us with the syllogism

343. ~· xxvi, 7.
344. ~· lxv, 24.
345. Ibid., lxv, 24.
346 • ~. i v' 3.
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of zeno, the founder of' the Stoic school: "Nullum malum gloriosum.
~; ~ autem gloriosa est; mors ergo BQn est malum.n347

claims Seneca, "Prof'ecisti!"348
the solution of' the problem.

Ex-

as he credits the master with

Far from assuring us even of' his

own credence in such a groundless proof', Seneca gives us herein
a note of' his own cowardice, an illustration of' his "let us de-

ceive ourselves" attitude seen earlier in this paper.349

As

evidence of' his still doubting mind, we find many illustrations
in his various works, the sole argument of' which is an attempt to
show that death is no evil.

Though his writings are replete with

this negative type of' argument, we must look far before coming
upon any reason at all for referring to death as "mora gloriosa."
He terms death a blessing in so much as it releases us from our
ills, "in malis optimum, supplicii f'inis"350

and he must even

qualify this statement by saying those who do not view death as
such are ignorant of' their own ills, "0 ignaros malorum suorum
quibus

~ ~

que.n351

ut optimum inventum naturae laudatur expectatur-

And he repeats the same point later in saying that,

"nihil mali mors attulit; omniua etiam malorum remisit patientiam.n352

It is therefore only in view of' man's liberation from

347. ~· lxxxii, 9.
348. Ibid., lxxxii, 9.
349. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 1.
ct. ante, p:-66.
350. ~· oi, 12.
351. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, XX, 1.
352. Ibid., XX, 0.
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the sufferings of life that death is to be looked upon as "glori0 sum".

For Seneca adhered to the strict Stoic teaching, that as

considered in itself and independent of the good it may procure
tor man, "Mors .a!2. bonum nee malum est. n353

He explains this

contention by saying that only "that which is something" (quod
aliquid est) is able to be a good or an evil.
The wise man, the Stoic wise man, must apply to death all
the mental attitudes with which he views other disagreeable necessities.

If he has acquired true virtue, Stoic virtue, he will

tear neither death nor the gods, knowing "mortem
deos malo n2B ~.n354

malum~!!!!'

Just why death is no evil; well, it a-

lone is the privilege of mankind, "~ ius aecum generis ~ru:,.n355
Mere assertion proves nothing, hence it is concluded
that the ffprivilegen aspect of death is merely its common aspect,

and since what is in store for every man must come to each, death
~hould

~ould

~o

be looked upon as a right.

Somewhat in the same vein

be the argument that illness is common to mankind;

hence~

bear it with patience one must cultivate the mental attitude

~hat

it is one of man's privileges.

confessing, "mors inter

Seneca weakens somewhat in

!!!! est, quae mala quidem

~ habent mali speciem."35 6

ta-

He tails as he so often does, to

353. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 4.
354. !E.· lxxv,
355. !£• cxxiii, 16.
~· cxvii, 22.
356. ~· lxxxii, 15.

rr:

~ ~~
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show just how death has merely the semblance of evil, when in
itself it surely contains, by his own admission, all the dread,
the fear, the dislike which are entities of evils he recognizes
as such.
~";

In death, Seneca tells us, there is "nullum incommod-

for there must exist something to which it is har.mful, "esse

enim debet aliguid, cuius sit incommodum."357
The point made
-herein
offers of several interpretations. If evil be considered
as a condition or a state, such as ill health or poverty, then
certainly

"~

nullum habet incommodum," for death admittedly is

no state, but merely the cessation of life in man.

If on the

other hand evil be viewed as anything from which human nature
naturally rebels, then indeed, death may possibly be no evil, but
not for the reason that it has no matter which it might affect.
When Seneca holds that, "mala enim bonaque circa aliqu~ !!£santur materiam,n 358 he exhibits rather shallow reasoning. For
though man dies but once, the fear, the dread of this one event
hangs like a pall over his entire life, serving as a controlling
influence in many of the decisions he must make during that life.
Again, if in stating "esse enim debet aliquid cuius sit incommod-

B!!!•" Seneca implies that death does not affect the body, he would
maintain one of two views: either man is not living when death
actually comes, and such an a·ssumption is preposterous; or he

357. !E• xxxvi, 10.
358. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 4.
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would hold that, with man still alive, the actual departure of
the soul is no evil.
assertion,

All of which brings us back to the mere

"~ergo~

est malum," without the semblance of

proof or reason tor holding this position.

Summing up his theo-

ries regarding the morality of death, Seneca admits he is at his
wits' end and as much as confesses that his philosophical vagaries were just that, vagaries.

"Vides ipsam

mortem~

malum

esse nee bonum."359
The goodness or badness of death is not inherent in the act of dying. Death may be termed good or evil depending on the manner in which one dies and the reason tor dying;360

just as the morality of any indifferent act.takes on its

aspect of sin or virtue in accordance with the circumstances and
end proposed.
tus,"36l

"Cato illa honestissime

~

est, turpissime Bru-

he says as illustrating the point.

In speaking of death, Seneca vouches several opinions on
the subject of inflicting capital punishment.

Readily does he

admit of both its legality and in certain circumstances of its
necessity.

But his thoughts are permeated with an abundance of

good judgment. "Ultima supplicia", he says are tor "sceleribus
ultimis."36 2
And the "potestatem vitae necisque" should be
prudently entrusted to a man who is calm in his decisions and

359. ~· lxxxii,
360. ~· lxvii,
361. ~· lxxxi.i,
362. De Ira, i,

13.
16.
12.
vi,

3.
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emotion.3 6 3

The executioner holds a position

which requires that he bring the utmost caution to his task, "ad
rem summa diligentia tractandam."3 64
Death is rightfully in_.__
flicted on public offenders for two reasons.

First this extreme

penalty serves as a warning to other would-be criminals, "ut
documentum omnium sit;"3 6 5 and secondly, the death sentence
metes out justice to those who, unwilling to be useful while alive, by their death are of service to the state.3 66
Seneca
would have even the condemned man himself look upon his sentence
as of benefit to himself.3 6 7
In the light of the teachings of Christianity under which
we live, and imbued as we are with the philosophy of this school,
we can view only with disgust the Stoic tenets advocating suicide.

Generally speaking, the Stoics were sufficiently clear in

their analysis to follow through to its conclusion the various
principles of their school.

And in nearly all cases their doc-

trines degenerated into a system of expedience, varying in law
and privilege according to prevailing circumstances.

Now while

their conduct on the whole followed such lines, there was one
phase of the code that certainly was believed by all and adhered

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

De Ira,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid. ,
Ibid.,

i,
i,
i,
i,
i,

xix,
xix,
vi,
vi,
vi,

8.
8.
4.
4.
3.
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to by most.

They would spend a great part of life sacrificing

ideals and stooping to the most immoral conduct with the one end
in view, to avoid suffering and death.

But strangely enough,

when their last resources had been exhausted, when no hope remained, when life had to be faced as it was, they calmly took
their own lives.

This being a convenient means of escape, the

violence of its nature required more than ordinary rationalization of one's mind regarding the benefits to be derived from suicide.

Seneca accordingly in many instances tries to convince

himself that suicide is justifiable.
He informs us that a study of Socrates will teach one how
to die if it be necessary, but that application to the words of
Zeno will enable one to die before it is necessary, "Socrates te
docebit ~ si necesse erit, Zeno antequam necesse erit.n3 68
Life with all its hardships is worth while only because death is
always available, ttcaram te, vita, beneficio mortis habeo.n369
By one step,

"~

gradu,n one may pass from the world or trial to

that of freedom, nlicet ad libertatem transire.n370

During life

it is the duty or a man to make himself agreeable to others; so
Seneca believed, following the teachings of the Epicureans.
as to our death, one need please himself alone.

368. ~· civ, 22.
369. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xx, 3.
370. Ibid., xx, 3.

But

The best type of

89
death is the one we like: "Vitam et aliis adprobare quisque deb~' mortem sibi.

Optima est, quae placet.n37l

In accordance

with these words, he says that just as one selects his ship for a
or a house when taking up his residence, so when he is
ready, "eligam sic mortem exiturus e vita.n3 72
In the vicissi-

~oyage,

tudes of life, many people pray for death.
by

which Seneca designates them.

"Demens" is the word

For just as against their will

it has been settled that all must some day die, so the time of
death is in their own hands.

The former is a necessity, but the

latter is a privilege: "invita positum est, ut
~anu est.

~voles,

Alterum tibi necesse ~' alterum licet.n373

in tua
He even

goes further in saying that one often has the duty of destroying

~imself, "saepe mori debemus.n374

In three instances,375 Seneca

~akes the trouble to enumerate the various ways and means of com~itting

suicide, pointing out the vital parts or the body.

He

offers the additional stimulus to the yet fearful, of exalting thE

371. ~· lxx, 12-13.
372. Ibid., lxx, 11.
373. Ep. cxv~~, 22.
374. !£. lxxvii, 10 •
.ID2.. xxvi, 10.
375. De Providentia, vi, 7-8.
De Ira, iii, xv, 4.
~· lxx, 21.
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courage required to take one's own life. 376

We are to under-

stand that nothing but our own will need postpone death: "Scias
moriendum nihil aliud in mora esse quam velle."377
In this
---adfeature
---of Senecan philosophy perhaps more than in any other instance do we find a radical variance with the standard of his
summum bonum.

Senecan principle of rectitude and correct living

is based on the "rerum natura."
gan.

"Secundum naturam" is his slo-

But in the matter of suicide, it is a fact born out by ex-

perience that this act is in complete rebellion to the propagation and nurturing of life as demanded by nature.

Did Seneca not

tell us that it is by instinct (instinctu voluntario} that all
men tend to preserve their existence? "Sicut feruntur omnes ad
conservationem sui.n378
But in upholding suicide, Seneca wrote
that we must let every season and every place teach us how easy
it is to renounce Nature379

and fling her gift back in her face,

omnia .!.2.!. locus doceat quam facile sit renuntiare
naturae et munus illi suum impingere.n3 80
This is Seneca's mor"~tempus,

tal sin against his own conscience.
with superlatives.
~eneca.

Cato's suicide is eulogized

"Consensus hominum fatebitur," declares

Cato reached the pinnacle of happiness (summam felicita-

376.

377.
378.
379.
380.

~·

lxx, 21.
De Providentia, vi, 7-9.
Ibid., ii, 11-12.
~· lxx, 12.
!£• lxx, 21.
~· xxxvi, 9.
~· civ, 29.
~ PrOVidentia, vi, 8.
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-

tem) when he clashed his will with nature's order that he continue living.3 81 The Scipios, the Catos, and other noted suicides or the day were ter.med the ncoetus sacer ••• contemptores
vitae.n3 82
If there is in Seneca any evidence at all that he had contact with the doctrines of Christianity, it quite possibly could
be indicated in the passage quoted hereafter.

Similarity or ex-

pression on a given topic offers no proof whatever that Senecan
teaching drew even in the slightest measure from the newly organized society of Christians.

The force of this statement is born

out in fact, since the spirit, the intention behind the teaching
of each school was radically different.
instances is a resemblance noted.

Only in a few material

But in the case presently re-

ferred to, we find distinct resemblance to Christian teaching on
the endurance of evil and the unlawfulness or taking one's life
merely to escape suffering.

Seneca says:

You will find men who have gone so far as to
profess wisdom and yet maintain that one should not
offer violence to one's own life, and hold it accursed for a man to be the means or his own destruction; we should wait, say they tor the end decreed
by nature.383
,
~e

advances no proof whatever for the condemning implication that

no wise man could reason thus~

Seneca merely intimates that in

381. Ibid., iii, 14.
382. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxv, 1.
383. ~· lxx, 14.
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following this line ot conduct, one is taking the more difficult
path in lite--and incidentally the one more in accord with principle. nHoc qui dicit, ~ videt ~ libertatis ~ cludere.n3 84
This phrase gives us a concrete illustration of just what
Seneca's "wise man" consisted.

It serves as an ideal example of

the fact that the "sapiens" first, last and always sought what
was most convenient, convictions regardless.

384.

~·

lxx, 14.
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CHAPTER X
SENECA SPEAKS ON LIFE AFTER DEATH

Seneca's belief in the rationality of the soul of man has
heretofore been pointed out.

The Stoic school whence he drew

many of his basic elements of belief, took issue with the Epicureans principally on the subject of virtus.

The latter would

describe the vir beatus as a man with well satisfied appetites.
But the Stoics on the other hand held that the vita beata consisted in a comfortable mind, a mind free from care, indifferent
to the physical ills which beset mankind.

Implied herein is the

fact that in man there is a superior part, a something not material which has it in its power to rise above the physical elements of life.

Strangely enough little thought was spent on de-

termining the actual nature of the soul or its faculties. The intense pragmatism of the Roman mind led the Stoic to live for the
present only.

What might come, what could possibly happen were

too indefinite, too subject to the element of fortuna for his
practical views.

In general, the Stoic doctrine might be summed

up in the expression, "live life as though at death you would
face annihilation."

The matter of existence after death, was en-

tirely up to the conjecture of the individual himself.
therein was a matter of choice.

Belief

The fact itself was indefinite;

life here and now was certain, and, hence, was the only sure governing feature of our conduct.

It is at this point that Seneca

differs widely from the parent school.

He does, indeed, voice
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the general tenets of Stoicism, and in several instances gives
evidence of the influence the Stoics exercised on him.

But in

seneca there burned a pride in himself, a longing for the future
that belied all his phrases to the contrary.

In his words on the

subject of life after death and immortality, Seneca reaches the
heights of his literary career.

These delays of mortal exist-

ence, he writes in one place, are a prelude to a longer and better life, "per has mortalis aevi moras illi meliori vitae lonsiorique proluditur."3 8 5 He likewise attains the heights of his
religious creed, if we credit him with belief in the matters he
states as merely possible.

Had Seneca the light of revelation to

guide him, and the depth of reason to arrive at the conclusion of
the discussion he so correctly begins, his writings might well
rank among the most elevated and orthodox ot the Christian
School.

As it is they resemble Christian teaching only in form;

the soul is lacking.
Life after death as treated by Seneca may be divided into
two main headings: a) the fact and nature of future existence;
b) and immortality.

We shall study them under these headings in

separate chapters.
First is noted the Stoic influence on Seneca, in so much as
he states, "mors est rum_ ~.n386

385.
386.

!£·
~·

cii, 23.
liv, 4.

But this is the only passage
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throughout his entire writings in which Seneca indicates that he
ever dwelt seriously on annihilation after death.
exact meaning of the

"~~"·is

explained in the light of his

own theory of what occurs after death.
happen, he assures us.

Even here, the

I know already what will

What I was before I was born, the same

will happen after my death.

He tells Lucilius that we are mis-

taken in thinking that death only follows, when in reality it has
both preceded us and will in turn follow us, "quicquid ante~
_
Since death restores us to that peaceful
fuit, mors est."3 8 7

___

state in which we lay before our birth, anyone who pities the
dead must also pity those who have not yet been born.3 88
Our
life is likened to a lamp, says Seneca, and

foo~s

are they who

would believe the lamp worse off when it was extinguished than
before it was lighted.
grave est?"3 8 9

And he asks, "reverti unde veneris quid

A rare instance of consistency with his own philosophy may
be noted in Seneca's remarks about the body of man.

The greater

part of his moral dissertations pertain to the good of the soul
whether here on earth or in the world to come.
call, is "ea pars quae melior est."390

The soul, we re-

As to our body, he as-

sures us that it is but "ossa cineresque."391

387. ~· liv, 5.
388. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 5.
389. De Tranqu1liitate Anim1, xi, 4.
390. De Constantia Sapientis, vi, 3.
Cf. ante, p. 41.
391. Ad Marciam ~ Consolatione., xxv, 1.

Our flesh is the
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baser part of our essence, and not at all necessary for our existence.

The matter of our bodies is no more a part of our ac-

tual self, than are the clothes and other protections we need for
comfort.39Z

Seneca opines that, after death, the soul never a-

gain has relationship with the body.

This latter was just an

instrument in this life, and at death it matters little what becomes of it.

"As to burial," he assures us in the words of Theo-

dorus, "you are a fool if you think it makes any difference to me
whether I rot above the ground or beneath it.n393

Concern over

one's obsequies is a waste of time, "minus molestiarum habet
funus tacitum!"394
In an attempt to appeal to unbiased reason, Seneca gives us
our choice in the matter of believing in future existence,395
saying that in either case, life or annihilation, he would be
prepared.

"Mors

~

aut consum.it aut exuit.

Emissis meliora

restant onere detracto consumptis nihil restat.n396

After death

the soul is either sent forth into a "meliorem vitam" or is mingled with nature again, and will return to the universe.397.
And after a lengthy discussion on the happiness of heaven, he
says, "but suppose that I am utterly annihilated, and that after

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxv, 1.
De Tranquiliitate Animi, xiv, 3.
Ibid., i, 13.
~· cii, 4.
~· xxiv, 18.
~· lxxi, 16.
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death nothing mortal remains?"

His answer is: "aegue magnum ani-

~ habeo, etiam si nusguam transiturus excedo.n398

But he does

confess that the very idea of going nowhere after death is a repulsive thought, an object of fear, nalius metus.n399

He tells

polybius that his grief for his brother is uncalled for since one
or the other of two views must be in accord with the actual fact:
the deceased kinsman if living in spirit is happy, or he is not
existing at all.
~aceror,

nQ,uid itaque,n says Seneca, "eius desiderio

qui aut beatus aut nullus est?

~, nullum dementia.n400

Beatum deflere invidia

But this entire theory of the abso-

lute end of life at death is stated purely and simply as a possibility that he is unable to prove away, while the mass of his
~itings

on the subject give all indication that Seneca enter-

tained more or less definite ideas about existence in the next
rworld.
As

though in utter contradiction to all he had told us,

Seneca reverses his position, saying, "Sursum illum (animum)
vacant initia ~.n40l

And, he continues, the soul will reach

this goal even before hand by correct living and by the contemplation of its eternal destiny.

One of the most beautiful of

Senecan phrases in substance as well as in literary expression,
is his comment, nthat day which you fear as being the end of all

398. !E· xciii,
399. !E· lxxxii,
400. A4 Polybium
401. E.Jl. lxxix,

10.
16.
de Consolatione, ix, 3.
12.
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things is your birthday in eternity" (dies iste, quem tamquam
extremum reformidas, aeterni, natalis est). 402
And as such it
may be taken as the key to the entire discussion of Seneca's belief in the life after death.

Se~king

to find some relationship

between the deeds of our present existence and the life which
follows death, Seneca assures us that he has striven to find out,
numquid stultum sit ac supervacuum ultra extremum
diem curas transmittere, an cadant bona nostra
nobiscum nihilque sit eius, qui nullus est, an ex
eo quod, cum erit sensure non sumus, ante~uam sit,
aliquis fructus percipi aut peti possit.4U3
And his opinion would be that we do receive reward hereafter for
virtue practiced: "Nulli non virtus et vivo et mortuo rettulit
gratiam, si modo illam bona secutus est fide."404

But Seneca

gives no indication whatever that this reward of virtue will come
in the world of spirit after death, or that the soul after death
will actually experience any degree of joy by reason of the deeds
it performed when united to the body.

The "sapiens" by a life

spent in accord with the tenets of philosophy merits nclaritatem
quae post mortem contingit."405

And though he is removed from

the actual sight of men, his memory still recurs to their minds,
"multa viri virtus animo multusque recursat.n4° 6
The usual motive in undertaking notable projects, says Seneca is that poster-

402. ~· cii, 26.
403. ~· cii, 4.
404. ~· lxxix, 18.
405. !E.· cii, ).
406. Aeneid, iv, J.
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itY will long remember our works.
(~} posteri taceant.n407

We continuously strive

"~

Hence our reward for the practice of

virtue in this life and in the life hereafter, is correctly interpreted as meaning the reputation we shall have earned while
yet alive, and the renown that will fall to our lot after our
death.

We conclude by observing that Seneca at no time attempts

to show any connectiom between the deeds of life and an accounting we might have to render for these actions in the life hereafter.

He seemed to hold that man's actions are entirely a mat-

ter of his individual choice, bearing no relationship with the
phases of man's existence.

These latter were inevitable regard-

less of how man acted.
We should expect that Seneca's conception of the future
life would be in keeping with his fears and desires of the present life.

The strife, the turmoil, the constant peril of life,

created in the storm-tossed breast of Seneca a longing for peace.
Even when referring to death as being possible annihilation, the
promise of escape from the present world of disorder offered its
negative but nevertheless somewhat consoling aspect.

Death is

for all the end, he tells us, but for many ~t is a relief, "~
est, omnibus finis, multis remedium.n4° 8
Telling Polybius that
life is but a tempestuous and gale-tossed sea, whose one harbor

407. De Tranquillitate Animi, i, 13.
408. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xx, 1.
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is death, he admonishes his friend not to mourn for his brother,
for death did but make him free and safe, "!! itaque invideris
fratri tuo; quiescit.

Tandem liber, tandem tutus."409

Death is

a release from all suffering, a boundary beyond which our ills
cannot pass.

A great and everlasting peace awaits the son of
Marcia, "excepit illum magna et aeterna pax.n 410
The "aeterna
requies"4ll

seems to hold sort of a spell over the turbulent

soul of Seneca.
Casting off the old forbidding Stoicism, with its fears and
stern aspects of joy, Seneca launches forth in many places
throughout his writings in praise of the joy and happiness he
hopes will one day be meted out to him.

His flights of fancy may

in no wise be construed into a Christian significance, though indeed there are elements or the qualities of a glorified soul, the
vision of God, the communion of saints, the science infused into the souls of the elect, and so on, to be found in his analysis
or heaven.

He tells Marcia that there awaits after earth's dull

motley the vision of all that is pure and bright, "manet ! !
fusis crassisque pura ~ liquida visentem.n412
died has not lost the light of day.
ceriorem sortitus est.n413

~

A person who has

On the contrary, "lucem sin-

Here below, our souls find little

reason to rejoice in their lot, that is, the fact of their existence.

But after death, freed from this darkness in which they
409. Ad Pol~bium de Consolatione, ix, 7.
410. ~ Mijr 1am de Consolat1one 1 xix, 6.
411. Ibid., xxiv, 5.
412. Ioid., xxiv, 5.
41'3. Ad Polvbium de Consolatione ix B
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grope they shall have absorbed the full light of day and shall
be restored to their place in the sky.

Released from its prison

below, the soul will cast off sin, and in purity and lightness
will leap up into the celestial realms of spirit.414

Once we

are set free from this place of shadows, heavenly light will
shine down upon us from all sides, "lux undique clara percutiet."4l5

And from the "excelsiorum locatorumff it will be a

pleasure for the souls to turn their gaze upon the things of
earth, and to look back·on all they have left behind.416
Bound, as it were, by the chains of mortal existence, the
soul at death admits of no limits of time or space, except such
as are binding even the gods.

For the native land of the soul of

man is the whole space that encircles the height and breadth of
the firmanent, "hoc

~

convexum intra quod iacent

maria~

terris, in quo disposita tot lumina in actus ~ excubant.n417
Death liberates the soul and admits it into an existence having
no boundaries, hence no servitude, "excessit terminos, intra quos
servitur.u418
From this sunken region (~ humili atque depresso
locum),4l9

the emancipated spirit delights in the boundless and

open sky, "fruitur ~ aperto et libero caelo.ff420

·
414. ~. lxxix, 12.
•
28.
415. Jm. cii 1
416. Ad Marc1am de Consolatione, xxv, J.
Ad Po+ybium~ Qonsolatiorie, .ix, 3-4.
21.
417. ~. CJ.J. 1
418. ~ Marc1am de Consolatione, xix, 6.
419. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 8.
420. Ibid., ix, 8.
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throughout the expanses of the universe and ncum summa voluptate"
explores all the delights of nature.421

Seneca would have us

picture to ourselves the brightness of the combined light of all
the stars.

For us the whole expanse of the heavens will shine

evenly.

When in our perfect state we shall enjoy the perfect
light, (~ totam lucem et totus aspexeris),4 22 then indeed we
shall realize that our earthly life was lived in darkness.

Here

below, Seneca warns us, we can but hope to enjoy the light which
now we see darkly with a vision that is cramped to the last degree, "lucem

~

per angustissimas oculorum vias obscure intuer-

is.n423
Another phase of the happiness of heaven is the associations
we shall have in the company of the elect.

He assures Marcia

that her son and her father rejoice together in heaven, the one
just arrived enjoying his new-found light, the other instructing
his grandson in the secrets of nature.4 24
In several places,
Seneca makes mention of our communion with the gods, as being one
of the joys of heaven.

"Patere mihi ad deos

~

iter judico.

Merui quidem admitti et iam inter illos fui animumque illo

~

And he says that our better thoughts order us to

421. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 8.
422. EE· cii, 28.-423. ~· cii, 28.
424. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxv, 3.
Ibid., xxvi-,-6.
425. ~· xciii, 10.

103
meet the god's approval, and to prepare ourselves to join them
at some future time.4 26
For the soul says to itself, "When the
day comes, I shall leave the body here where I found it, and
shall of my own volition betake myself to the gods.n4 2 7
Seneca promises us that in the life hereafter our knowledge
of the secrets of nature will be complete.

Some day the hidden

laws of the universe will be revealed to us, "aliquando naturae
In the
tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo.n4 28
expanses of the universe, the soul explores the blessings of

'f

nature, "illic vagatur omnia que rerum naturae bona perspici t. n429
Marcia's father initiates her young son in the wonders of the
universe and he is qualified to do so having the information not
by guess-work but, by experience, having true knowledge .of them
all,

"~ ~

coniectura sed omnium ex

~

peritus in arcana

naturae libens ducit.n430
Regarding the negative aspects of the joys of the life
hereafter, Seneca enmaerates at length the many trials we shall
escape when we become partakers of the blissful hereafter.

En-

compassed, no doubt, with the worries and trials of this life,
he often thought of a happiness consisting merely in the absence
of each and every troublesome event with which this present life

426. !£· cii, 29.
427. !£· cii, 22.
428. !£• cii, 28.
429. Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 8.
430. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxv, 2.
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is replete.

There will be no fear of want, no "diviitiarum cura"

which became quite a problem to Seneca in his later years.

No

stings of lust which through the pleasure they give the body
destroy the integrity of the soul; no envy of another's prosperity; no disaster to the land or to himself will he meet with in
this future life.431

Life after death will, therefore, consist

in the presence of what we like and the absence not only of suffering, but of the desires of those things which cause us displeasure whether by the gratification of these desires or by
their inhibition.
Throughout his discussions on death and the life hereafter,
Seneca at best has little of the supernatural element in view.
His heaven is joyful only in so far as one could be joyful here
below were the difficult things of life removed.

There is not

one definite place, for example, where he would indicate that his
future happiness is awarded as the result of virtuous living.

In

fact he told us that his "virtus" contained its own reward.43 2
There was nothing more in store for one who conquered his lower
nature in this life, than the resulting convenience he would experience here and now.

There was apparently no relationship'be-

tween the actual deeds of this life and the mode of future existence, and if we examine closely, the reason or explanation there-

431. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 5-6.
432. De Vita Beata, ix, 4.
Cf. ante, p. 52.
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fore seems evident.
ard.

Seneca in life, was true to no moral stand-

At death he seems a disillusioned old man; an old man who

had sacrificed every ideal he preached, for the comfort of the
moment.

He had only the fears of life as his real standard.

His was more of a goal to be avoided than to be attained.

His

was an existence, pleasant not so much by the things he enjoyed
but rather by the evils he escaped.

Now did Seneca associate

the hereafter, the one and only hope of true happiness left to
him, with any type of pain or punishment, his last real hope
would thereby have proved a vain expectation.

The unreasonable-

ness of a joyful existence in the life after death for both the
good and the wicked never seemed to occur to Seneca.

~uite

likely he was willing to grant to everyone else, regardless of
personal merit, the same felicity he hoped for himself.

Such

was Seneca, the mild-mannered, affable Seneca as men knew him.
Thus it is that in dealing with the question of whether there be
life after death or not, he offers us alternatives positive and
negative.

In the latter event there is no suffering, he says,

since it is the same as not being.

In the first hypothesis, and

this is his personal choice of the two, it must necessarily follow that since man continues to exist he must therefore necessarily be in a happy state.

There is no proof given or reason in-

dicated why such should be the case.
as a fact.

Seneca merely asserts it

Epicurus had taught some sort of punishment due those

who die after a wicked life.

But, says Seneca,

n~ ~

puer
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est n433 as to believe all the stories of the "inferorum metus".
_,
He says that he is not so foolish, n~ ~ tam ineptusn434

as

to give credence to the stories of the underworld, of Cerberus,
Ixion and the spectral garbs.435

The whole business of fear and

punishment makes up the stories of poets:
Cogita nullis defunctum malis adfici, illa,
quae nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, fabulas
esse, nullas imminere mortuis tenebras nee oaroerem nee flumina igne flagrantia nee oblivionem
amnem nee tribunalia et reos et in illa libertate
tam laxa ullos iterum tyrannos: luserunt ista
poetae et vanis nos agitavere terroribus. Mors
dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis, ultra quem
mala nostra exeunt.436
But still Seneca speaks of the dying as ntimentes
sirit"437

~

apud inferos

and definitely implies that one must needs argue with

himself and endeavor to convince oneself that the underworld is
actually a compilation of fiction, "persuaseris istas fabulas
And again he does tell Marcia that following the
death of her father, his soul "tarried above us while he was being purified and was ridding himself of all the blemishes and
stain that still clung to him from his mortal existenoe.n439

433. ~· xxiv, 18.
434. Ibid., xxiv, 18.
435. ~· xxiv, 18.
!P_. lxxxii, 16.
Cf. Juvenal, Sat. ii, 149.
436. Ad Maroiam de Consolatione, xix, 4.
437. ~· lxxxii, 16.
438. ~· lxxxii, 16.
439. Ad Maroiam de Consolatione, xxv, 1.
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But these are the only instances where Seneca would imply any
type of unhappiness in the life after death, and he is quick to
apply here the "nosmet ipsi fallamusn440

cure for all uneasiness

and fear.

440. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xix, 2.
Cf. Pp • 67, BO.

r
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CHAPI'ER XI

SENECAN VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY
With reference to Seneca's views on immortality, it is sufficient to have established his position regarding the life after
death.

The expression "sufficient" is used purposely because in

every passage wherein he speaks of the happiness of the life
hereafter, he invariably qualifies it with the note that its felicity is everlasting.

In the metaphysical searchings of Seneca,

the immortality of the soul is perhaps the one element which is
most devoid of argument or question--it is taken for
is the "~ gratissima"441

gr~nted.

of his letter to Lucilius.

It

And for

the Stoics and Seneca in particular, it was sufficient that a
matter be "gratissimaff for it to be proved beyond a doubt.

At

no time does he offer to dispute as to the fact of life after
death being eternal in duration.

But as evidence that there was

a discussion among the ancients regarding the immortality of the
soul, Seneca quotes the example of Canus who, as he was being led
to execution, remarked, "You are wondering whether our souls are
immortal, but I shall soon know.n44 2
And Seneca praises him in
his search for the truth even when confronted with the fact of
his own death, "~ desiit veritatem in ipso fine.u443

Seneca

himself would begin the discussion on the future life by admit-

441. ~. cii, 2.
442. De Tranquillitate Animi, xiv, 8.
443. Ibid., xiv, 8.
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ting the possibility of its non-existence.

But after aerely pre-

senting such an alternative to our credence, he proceeds at great
length to show his personal belief in continued life of the soul
after death.

And once this fact is established, the eternal du-

ration of the future life goes along with the life as if a natural element of it.

For Seneca, just as the

~act

of

li~e

after

death implies that it could be only a happy life, so also by the
same token, this life must also be eternal.

He tells us that,

"I was taking pleasure in investigating the immortality of souls,
nay in believing that doctrine ••• and
to pass over into that
nity" (in

~ensum

~eeling

in~inity o~ t~e

that I was destined

and the heritage of eter-

illud tempus et !£possessionem omnis aevi

transiturus).444
In the hurry and rush of life, man

~requently

becomes so

much a part of the passing elements among which he lives, that,
says Seneca, seldom does he
eternal importance.

li~t

his mind to consider things

o~

"Man is too mortal to comprehend things im-

mortal" (tamen homo ad immortalium cogitationem nimis mortalis
est).445

But he admits the fact that all men are imbued with

the innate desire of immortality.

He tells us that while we have

all the fears of mortals, "omnia tamquam immortales concupisci-

444. ~· cii, 2.
445. De Otio, v, 7.
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tis."446

And he says of mankind·in general that we plan for the

things of eternity.447
~uite

obviously mortal man cannot attain his immortal sta-

tus here below in this life.

It is, therefore, but taken for

granted that all immortality spoken of by Seneca refers to existence after death.

He assures Marcia that not her son, but only

his very imperfect likeness has perished.

For the boy himself is

eternal and in death has reached a far better state, stripped of
all outward encumbrances and left simply to himself, "ipse quidem
aeternus meliorisque

~

is et sibi relictus."44 8

status est, despoliatus oneribus alienA

person in life, considered in his

soul, is actually immortal, but he does not take on the evidence
of immortality until his death.

After death "aeternus est."449

One of the joys of a soul reaching its destiny after its separation from the body, is the knowledge that its felicity will endure forever.

In the light of this knowledge, it proceeds to the

enjoyment of all that has been or will be throughout the ages of
all time, "aeternitatis

~

memor in

~

quod fuit futurumque

est vadit omnibus saeculis."450
The fact of immortality is but an attribute of the main

446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

De Brevitate Vitae, iii, 4.
~· C1, 1.
Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxiv, 5.
Ad Polybium de Consolatione, ix, 7.
Ad Helviam de Consolatione, xx, 2.
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feature, the existence of life after death.

As such, it is in-

dependent of its subject, regardless of the nature of this life.
But we have seen, that in Seneca's order of things, there is but
the one mode of existence after death.

Happiness is the lot of

man in the next world, and eternal is his joy: "Felices animae
animae et aeterna sortitae.n45l

451. Ad Marciam de Consolatione, xxvi, 6.
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CHAPTER XII
SUMN.ARY AND CONCLUSION

It has been our endeavor in this thesis to collect from the
many writings of Seneca, those expressions of moral and philosophic thought, the summation of which might be termed nsenecan
Philosophy.n

For several reasons this was not an easy task.

First, throughout the course of Seneca's works many contradictions occur, a fact that often prohibits the drawing of definite
conclusions as to which of several opposing courses Seneca adheres.

Secondly, and somewhat following from the above-mentioned

point, the statements of Seneca almost invariably need analysis
and interpretation.

The contradictory elements and ambiguous

terminology on occasion give rise to a number of possible meanings, and it is our conclusion that Seneca himself was often at a
loss as to just what he intended to say.

In looking into the

man's life for confirmation of some principle or another, we were
further confused, in that the philosopher Seneca was a much different man than Seneca the statesman.

With regard to this latter

point, his inconsistency led Fabius to remark that had his judgment and action been answerable to his wit, it had been much more
for Seneca's reputation.
describes Seneca as a shallow thinker,'"in
philosophia parum diligens.n45 2
This expression adequately
~uintilian

452. Institutiones Oratoriae, x, i, 125.
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states the depth or lack of depth of Senecan thought.

His weak-

ness was his love for compromise, in action and in teaching.
Personally, he seemed convinced of nothing.

His was a type of

negative existence, the living of life to avoid pain.

In some

few instances, he attempts to justify by his writings this servility to changing circumstances; in most cases, however, he
states what he thinks should be done, with a bland disregard of
his own condemning actions.
He prided himself on being a pupil of the Stoic school,
which taught a system of rigorous self-discipline that trained
its adherents to cope with any of the vicissitudes of life.
Stoicism was afraid of life and of emotions because they hurt,
and it was to this school that Seneca allied himself.

But the

strict following of these precepts was too much for his vacillating and negative will.

He was a bold, inconsistent moralist

preaching rather than exemplifying Stoic virtue.

Thus it is,

that Seneca's life, his writings, and often his thoughts formed
three divergent streams in all of which Seneca found himself to
his own consternation.
The writings of Seneca at their best, show no evidence of
having been inspired by the teachings of Christianity.

He, like

other Romans of the day, could not help having learned about the
new Religion, but he made no distinction between the Christians
and the J"ews, whom he termed "gens sceleratissima."453
Seneca's
453. Quoted by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei,Lib.vi,Cap.ii.
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brother, Gallio, refused to hear St. Paul speak in his own behalf, and with this refusal there passed forever the opportunity
for influence of the great Apostle on this gifted but haughty
Roman family.

Seneca's conceptions of rectitude, death and the

future life must be viewed as literary speculations, rather than
as his·religious beliefs.

And any resemblance which Senecan mo-

rality holds to Christian Doctrine is purely material in substance.

Moreover, we hasten to add that, contrary to the prac-

tice observed in a number of commentaries on Senecan morality,
one cannot isolate phrases of Senecan teaching and correctly
understand them.

His philosophical opinions offer of accurate

interpretation only when associated with their respective contexts.

In

t~e

course of this. paper, all citations from the works

of Seneca have been interpreted in this light.
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